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 In January of 1907, British Foreign Official Eyre Crowe wrote a memorandum detailing 
the present relations between Great Britain, France and Germany. In this memorandum, Crowe 
argued that war between Britain and Germany could not be avoided for long. This study 
examines Eyre Crowe’s influence in the British Foreign Office. It argues that Crowe had 
significant influence in the foreign office and that he was correct with what he argued in the 
1907 memorandum. Using primary documents from both the British Foreign Office and the 
German government, this thesis contends that the 1907 memorandum caused increased hostility 
towards the German Government from the British Foreign Office. This hostility made British 
leaders unlikely and sometimes unwilling to cooperate with the German government in a series 
of diplomatic events. These events included the First and Second Moroccan crises, the building 
of the German navy and the Baghdad railway and ultimately culminated with the July Crisis in 
1914. It was what Crowe argued in his memorandum coupled with the increased hostility 
towards the German government that led Great Britain into entering the First World War. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
In 1914 “the war to end all wars” began over the assassination of an Austrian Archduke. But 
hidden behind the spark of the war was the leadership of the various countries’ choices to go to 
war over a seemingly isolated conflict between Serbia and Austria. Historians have been 
debating the countries’ motivations presumably since the war ended. This thesis will cover 
Anglo-German diplomacy in the pivotal years leading up to the war.  Both Germany and Great 
Britain chose to aid their allies in the conflict, but for very different reasons. 
 There had been a growing hostility between Great Britain and Germany since the turn of 
the century. Germany’s growing power and status on the European continent put them in direct 
confrontation with Britain. It was not, however, until the Liberal party took power in 1906 that 
British leaders became wary and ultimately hostile towards Germany. Any political power shift 
causes changes in diplomatic policy, but with the Liberal party’s rise to power came the 
promotion and influence of Eyre Crowe. Crowe had been working for the British Foreign Office 
since 1885, but in 1906 he was promoted to senior clerk and became the supervising head of the 
western department. 
 In 1907, Crowe published a memorandum discussing British foreign policy in regards to 
France and Germany. Crowe argued that German politics were putting Germany in direct 
confrontation with England and that a war between the two countries could not be avoided. 
Crowe was ultimately right. This memorandum was highly influential and widely circulated in 
the foreign office; it also created hostility towards the German government in the British Foreign 
Office. That hostility affected British foreign policy in regards to how Britain dealt with 
Germany.  
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  This thesis will be composed in six chapters. The first chapter is a broad overview of the 
historiography surrounding Anglo-German diplomacy, WWI and the Eyre Crowe memorandum. 
The historiography surrounding World War I is vast and could take a person a lifetime to read. 
Instead, I discuss the most important schools of thought on the subjects, as to not bog the thesis 
down with an inordinate amount of historiography. 
 The second chapter will take a closer examination of Eyre Crowe, his position within the 
foreign office and a detailed look at the 1907 memorandum. Crowe is a fascinating man with an 
interesting history. It is a shame more is not written about his life. The next four chapters are 
essentially case studies. Chapter three examines the First and Second Moroccan Crises and how 
the view of German politics changed in the British Foreign Office. As no discussion of Anglo-
German diplomacy during this time period would be complete without a mention of the German 
navy, it is the topic of chapter four. Often overlooked in German history, a discussion of the 
politics surrounding the Baghdad railway comes next. The thesis ends with the beginning of the 
war and a discussion of the July crisis and the political reasoning behind why Germany and 
Great Britain decided to join the war. 
 The title “Shades of Grey” may not be explicitly clear to the reader, but it serves a dual 
purpose. In one instance it refers to Sir Eyre Crowe, who often stood in the shadow of Sir 
Edward Grey in the foreign office and in importance. But it also refers to the diplomacy going on 
between the two countries. While officials saw everything in black and white, the actual 
diplomatic events and negotiations were mostly a grey area. Parties on both sides would say and 
do things they didn’t really intend to sway the other side. 
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Chapter I: Historiography  
 
 
Historians have looked at the origins of World War I differently, each taking his or her own facet 
of the conflict and relating it to the bigger problems within the balance of power in prewar 
Europe. The historiography of the First World War includes subsidiary debates over each 
countries motivations and aims in entering into the conflict. Germany and Great Britain both 
chose to go to war in the fateful summer of 1914 on behalf of their allies.  The roots of Anglo-
German hostility go back several decades. 
The causes of Anglo-German tensions have been looked at in different ways by historians 
of German and British history. This chapter will survey the historiography of Anglo-German 
political tensions and, in specific, Eyre Crowe- an official in the British Foreign Office. The first 
section will cover the historiography behind German political motivations, underlying tensions 
and the coming of the war in context of Germany. The second section will survey the British 
literature dealing with the rising Anglo-German tensions and British aims prior to the war. The 
final section will look at the historiography on Eyre Crowe with a focus on his 1907 
Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany and how the 
memorandum influenced Anglo-German relations.  
 
Section I: Germany 
At the end of the First World War, the blame for causing the war was placed on the shoulders of 
the German Empire. Since then historians have searched for the reasons why German leaders 
chose war during the fatal summer of 1914 and their political motivations for doing so. The 
majority of German historians focus on mounting Anglo-German tensions as the motivation for 
Germany’s decision to back Austria in the First World War. It becomes obvious that Germany 
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and Great Britain were running head-long into a conflict that would bring them to war with each 
other, but historians, however, disagree about what the underlying roots of the conflict were for 
Germany.  
 In the 1920s, German historian Eckert Kehr focused on the socio-economic problems 
which brought the two countries into conflict in his essay, “Anglophobia and Weltpolitik.” Kehr 
argued that it was not foreign politics that caused Germany and Great Britain to rush towards war, 
but socio-economic problems within Germany that put Germany in direct competition with Great 
Britain. For instance, Germany’s agriculture and industry put Germany in direct competition 
with the leading agricultural and industrial powers in Europe, namely Russia and England. 
Furthermore, Kehr argued that foreign policy “was contingent on the simultaneous stand with 
respect to domestic politics and the resolution of the social crisis.”1 The social crisis Kehr was 
referring to was the rise of the Social Democrats in German government. The conservative 
power-holders in the government saw their powerbase falling away from them, and Kehr 
contended they began to use foreign policy to solve the internal political problems they were 
having in their government. Kehr argued that it was the primacy of domestic politics that fueled 
the growing Anglo-German tensions over economics and the navy.   
Kehr showed how the navy was actually a political weapon used by the conservatives in 
the government to combat the proletariat. The government wanted the navy as a way to expand 
their foreign policy against Britain on one hand, but it also gave Germany a cause around which 
various interest groups in Germany could rally.. This allowed the navy to be used as a 
propaganda piece and “was intended to provide the power-political basis for a successful foreign 
policy, which in turn was meant to stabilize the internal political and social position of the ruling 
                                                 
1
 Eckart Kehr, “Anglophobia and Weltpolitik” in Economic Interest, Militarism and Foreign Policy: Essays on 
German History ed. Gordon Craig, translated by Grete Heinz (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977) 34. 
 5 
strata against the threat of social democracy.”2 Thus, the government was using the German navy 
to fuel support for its conservative regime by claiming the navy furthered the country’s political 
prestige. Kehr was not well-received by German historians during the time. Not until after Kehr 
died were his opinions recognized as important pieces of German socio-economic history. 
In 1961, historian Fritz Fischer argued the causes of World War I were much simpler. 
Fischer claimed that Germany had the “general intent to fight a war in order to make Germany a 
‘world power’ equal to Britain or Russia.”3  Fischer’s book disagreed with many of the major 
arguments the German government had used to justify war including the myth that Germany’s 
enemies were trying to encircle the country.4 Fischer argued that the German leadership had 
intended to wage a war all along; they had simply been waiting for an opportunity to start a war 
when they felt it favored Germany. This is not to say that there was not underlying Anglo-
German tension. Fischer stated “Wilhelm II’s insistence that Germany must not yield place to 
England coloured both his own political creed and the ideas of the great majority of his ministers 
and Secretaries of State.”5 Clearly, Fischer saw the heightened Anglo-German tensions prior to 
the war, but he argued it was because Kaiser Wilhelm II was intent on making Germany equal to 
Britain by any means necessary, including war.  
This does not mean Germany intended to go to war with England. Quite the contrary, 
Fischer argued Germany wanted to secure British neutrality so that Germany would have a free 
hand on the continent. Fischer claimed that Bethmann-Hollweg, who replaced Bülow as 
chancellor in 1909, was doubtful that Britain would actively intervene in a European conflict if it 
                                                 
2
 Eckart Kehr, “Tirpitz’s Naval Propaganda,” in Economic Interest, Militarism and Foreign Policy: Essays on 
German History ed. Gordon Craig, translated by Grete Heinz (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977) 34. 
3
 Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton & Company Inc, 1967) xi. 
4
 Imanuel Geiss, “The Outbreak of the First World War and German War Aims” Journal of Contemporary History 1 
no. 3 (Jul 1966): 80. 
5
 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 8. 
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appeared the provocation came from France or Russia. Bethmann-Hollweg used this assumption 
to try to make Russia look like it was the instigator when war did break out in 1914. Fischer 
argues Bethmann-Hollweg delayed telegrams from Britain to Austria about mediation during the 
July crisis and lied to the British office about sending them as an attempt to maneuver Germany 
into a better position and keep Britain out of the war.6 Wilhelm II was not convinced of the 
likelihood of British neutrality, as he knew that Britain could never allow France to collapse 
completely. But he was ready to face a war on the continent even if Britain, France and Russia 
were against him.7 Fischer used all of this to argue that German leaders had not been trying to 
maintain the peace in Europe, but had been actively seeking a war in order to expand German 
power. According to Fischer, the reason Germany and Great Britain went to war in 1914 had 
little to do with the political tension between them, and everything to do with aggressive German 
tendencies. The German government wanted the country to be an equal power to Great Britain 
and Russia. The only way German leaders felt Germany could do that was by expanding in 
Europe and gaining overseas colonies, which meant taking territory from other countries via war.  
German Historian Gerhard Ritter disagreed with Fisher. He devoted the third volume of 
his work, Staatskunst and Kreigshandwerk: das Problem des Militarismus in Deutschland, on 
German militarism to discrediting Fischer’s arguments. Ritter argued that the German 
government’s policies in World War I were defensive in nature but that the policies took a more 
offensive turn as the war continued.8 
In 1973, historian Volker Berghahn picked up where Kehr left off. Berghahn argued in 
Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 that German Admiral Tirpitz’s naval policy, while 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 71. 
7
 Ibid.,30- 32 
8
 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “The Debate on German War Aims” Journal of Contemporary History 1 no. 3 1914 (July 
1966): 67. 
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initially helpful in suppressing the proletariat, eventually encountered opposition at home and 
abroad. Opposition came from the British both in terms of economic and naval power as the 
Germans were encroaching on British interests. Opposition from home occurred because many 
Germans believed economic rivalry with Britain would “lead inevitably to a political 
confrontation” and because Germany had hit a period of stagnant growth with its economy in 
shambles. 9 Berghahn stated “It was at this point that the domestic and the foreign political aims 
of the naval programme merged into a single all-embracing consideration: the stabalisation of the 
Prusso-German political system.”10 Berghahn noted that the overarching problem of the country 
was not foreign policy but a domestic political system in which the conservative government was 
doing everything in its capacity to hold onto power. Revolution seemed to be brewing behind 
every corner in the German monarchy. 
With the political problems inside Germany coming to a head, Berghahn argued the 
government’s way out was to “escape into war.”11 The conservative government believed 
Germany was being encircled and “put into a territorial straightjacket” by the entente powers, 
which thwarted German ambitions.12 In addition, the monarchy and right parties were quickly 
losing power in the government and the left and center parties were approving taxes that hurt 
their position. In reaction, the right became more extreme in adhering to the status quo, making it 
unlikely that they would be able to compromise with the other parties. Berghahn argued this 
meant the conservatives had to take higher risks to stay in power, which included resorting “to 
violence as long as there was still a chance of victory.”13 Berghahn contended the government 
believed the only way out of this political quagmire was an escape into war whenever the 
                                                 
9
 V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993)49 
10
 Ibid., 53. 
11
 Ibid., 2. 
12
 Ibid., 147. 
13
 Ibid., 177. 
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moment arose. In fact, the German leadership believed the sooner the better since it was believed 
that Germany had a limited window of opportunity to win such a war. The effect of this decision 
was that the “Chancellor and his political advisers became less and less concerned with finding a 
peaceful solution to the crisis. Instead they made increasing efforts to create conditions for such a 
war which were as favorable as possible to the central powers.”14  
British historian Paul M. Kennedy took a different stand in his book, The Rise of Anglo-
German Antagonism, 1860-1914 published in 1980. He argued that Germany and Great Britain 
came into conflict because of the shifting economic balance in Europe.  Great Britain’s status in 
Europe had been declining while the status of Germany had been rising. In a half-century 
“Germany grew out of its position as a cluster of insignificant States under insignificant 
princelings’” to a major power player on the world stage. 15 This challenged the other major 
powers already in place in Europe, the largest being Great Britain.  
Kennedy exhaustively traced the roots of the conflict on both sides, and he finds three 
main sources of the conflict: economical, geographical, and ideological. The rising industrial 
sector in Germany challenged Britain’s leading industrial status, but Kennedy argued this does 
not necessarily lead to a growing tension.  Rather it was Germany’s growing navy that put the 
two countries at odds over control of the sea. Furthermore, Kennedy stated that the British 
leadership might not have reacted to the growing German empire if it had been located “at some 
safe distance away.”16 Germany’s proximity to Great Britain and the areas into which Germany 
was expanding caused great concern about Britain’s national security. Kennedy also noted the 
ideological issues between liberal Great Britain and the “reactionary” Germany, but he argued 
that this ideological hostility would not have led to a conflict alone.  Kennedy maintained that 
                                                 
14
 Ibid.,213. 
15
 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (New York: Humanity Books 1980) 466. 
16
 Ibid., 465. 
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these three things were subsets of the larger problem of Germany within the balance of power in 
Europe.  It was Germany’s expansion at the expense of its neighbors that upset the status quo in 
Europe. Great Britain, as the leading country at the time, had the most to lose if the balance was 
upset. This, Kennedy argued, is what increased hostility between the two countries. 
In addition, Kennedy stated that Germany began to believe that war with Great Britain 
was inevitable. The German leadership felt that England was the greatest rival and “that an 
Anglo-German conflict was, in the long term, unavoidable.”17 This became even more of a 
reality when Kaiser Wilhelm II appointed Bernhard von Bülow as Chancellor. Kennedy claimed 
that Bülow contributed to the growing Anglo-German tensions because “he had never at any 
time shown enthusiasm for an alliance with that country [Great Britain].”18 Kennedy noted this 
was a shift from previous German chancellors who had always had difficulty with Great Britain 
but had ultimately wanted to bring Germany and England into an alliance together.   
Bülow wanted to keep “Germany at arm’s length from Britain.”19 Bülow believed that an 
Anglo-Russian war was coming that would greatly weaken both Britain and Russia and allow 
Germany to become the center of the world stage. If a conflict were to break out between 
Germany and Great Britain, Bülow thought it would be possible to fall back on the alliance with 
Russia. This made him all the more confident in his dealings with Great Britain.  Moreover, 
Kennedy argued that Bülow believed “he had to eliminate Britain’s global predominance in 
order to secure Germany’s ‘place in the sun.’”20 Kennedy contended that this made the situation 
worse; Bülow’s policies only increased the tensions between the two countries.  
                                                 
17
 Ibid., 224. 
18
 Ibid., 226. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid., 227. 
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In 1985 Historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler took Berghahn’s theory a step further arguing that 
not only did the conservative government “escape into the future” in 1914, but in fact he argued 
the German government had used war to solve its domestic political strife for centuries in his 
book, The German Empire: 1871-1918. This bolstered the theory that the German leadership was 
embedded in a culture that predisposed it to use war as a way to break domestic political 
deadlocks, including using the July Crisis in 1914.  
Furthermore, Wehler arguef that it was not the trade rivalry that fueled the tension 
between Germany and Great Britain. It was the “contrasting political values of the two 
countries—that is, their quite different historical traditions, political cultures and their underlying 
social configurations” that caused the conflict.21 Wehler contended the stark contrast between the 
liberal parliamentary government in Great Britain and the conservative monarchical government 
in Germany as a leading factor driving a wedge between the two countries. Even though both 
countries had monarchies and parliaments, Germany could hardly have been considered a liberal 
government whereas Great Britain could have hardly been considered a strict monarchy. Wehler 
believed it was the opposing political and social structures in the two countries that caused them 
to be at odds with each other. 
 In contrast, David E. Kaiser argued in his article “Germany and the Origins of the First 
World War” that while domestic political problems were important in Germany’s course to war; 
Weltpolitk (foreign politics) “made war more likely.”22 Even if German leaders were using 
foreign politics to supplant problems domestically, it was the foreign policy that made war a part 
                                                 
21
 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire: 1871-1918 (New York: Berg Publishers, 1997) 187. 
22
 David E. Kaiser, “Germany and the Origins of the First World War,” Journal of Modern History 55 no. 3 (Sep. 
1983) 448.  
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of their plans. Kaiser claimed that “the originators of Weltpolitik looked forward to a series of 
small-scale, marginal foreign policy successes, not to a major war.”23 
In the mid 1980s, political scientist Stephen Van Evera stated that “Europeans embraced 
a set of political and military myths….this mindset helped to mold the offensive military 
doctrines which every European power adopted during the period 1892-1913.”24 Van Evera 
contends that the German military glorified these offensive doctrines and that this exacerbated 
the July Crisis.25 Furthermore, Van Evera argues that World War I “arose from a web of six 
remarkable misperceptions that were prevalent in Europe during the years before the war” in his 
article “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914.”26 Van Evera contends that while all six 
misconceptions were “especially popular in Germany, they flourished throughout the 
continent.”27 Among the list of misconceptions is the cult of the offensive. 
Matthew Stibbe took a radically different view, claiming an intense German Anglophobia 
was the major reason for the two countries to be in conflict in his 2001 book, German 
Anglophobia and the Great War, 1914-1918. While his research focuses mainly on the two 
countries after World War I had already started, he makes some interesting points about 
Anglophobia prior to the war as well. He claimed that hardened Anglophobes such as the Kaiser 
and Admiral Tirpitz had always perceived England as the “chief obstacle to the achievement of 
Germany’s continental and world power aspirations.”28 But by August of 1914, even men who 
had looked upon Britain favorably began to share this view as well. 29 Furthermore, rumors 
                                                 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9 
no. 1 (Summer, 1984): 59 
25
 Ibid., 65. 
26
 Stephen Van Evera, “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914” World Politics 38 no. 1 (Oct. 1985) 81. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Matthew Stibbe, German Anglophobia and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001) 11. 
29
 Ibid 
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began to circulate around Germany that Great Britain not Russia that had started the war. A 
German naval officer, Count Ernest Graf zu Reventlow, argued that economic greed has caused 
Britain to start a “war of destruction” against Germany.30 Members of the German press went as 
far as to accuse German ambassadors of failing to understand Britain’s real motivations and 
claiming that they were duped by Sir Edward Grey. 31 Stibbe argued that this intense 
Anglophobia meant that the war went on longer than it needed to. That this intense hatred 
appeared in Germany before the first shots were fired seems to imply that there was already an 
underlying Anglophobia in Germany. The outbreak of the war simply exacerbated the position 
and brought it to the forefront. 
Obviously the historiography of German tensions related to Great Britain and the coming 
of the First World War contains many different answers. Some historians stress domestic 
problems are the real cause behind the growing antagonism, others see German aggression or the 
shifting balance of power in Europe as the real cause of the tension. 
 
Section II: England 
While German causes or motivations for war can be leveled at any number of issues, the 
historiography about the British motivations for declaring war tend to be far less controversial. 
Almost all arguments about the British reasons for going to war revolve around maintaining the 
status quo in Europe. While historians might argue over where the international tension came 
from, almost all agree that it was in the best interests of the British to maintain the existing 
conditions on the continent. 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., 27. 
31
 Ibid., 15. 
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Before the First World War had even ended, historian Bernadotte Schmitt was arguing 
that Anglo-German political tensions were not over jealousy or envy of Germany, but about 
British self-preservation in England and Germany 1740-1914. Great Britain was willing to 
accommodate German ambitions except in one respect, naval supremacy. Schmitt argued that 
because the navy was so vital to British way of life it was “irresistibly driven to maintain a 
supreme navy.”32 Furthermore, Schmitt argued that the root of the conflict was not so much over 
the navy as it was over France. He stated that German diplomacy tried to prevent a 
rapprochement between Great Britain and France, even though both countries had been 
determined to attain it. Schmitt asserted that even though Britain had assisted France in resisting 
excessive demands from Germany in both 1905 and 1911, on the eve of the war the German 
chancellor asked “the British Government to stand aside while Germany appropriated French 
colonies.”33 
 In addition, Schmitt argued that the agreements Great Britain signed with France in 1904 
put Britain on the side of Germany’s traditional enemy. The Anglo-French entente restored the 
balance of power to a continental Europe that had long been dominated by Germany. The power 
balance put Britain into a struggle with Germany. Germany had long wanted to become a world 
power rather than just a European power, and it could not do this with Britain standing in the 
way on the continent. It was Britain’s bolstering of France in the face of German power that 
caused the tension between the two countries. 
 Keith Wilson argued that Sir Edward Grey and by extension British Foreign Policy was 
based on one principle, “the avoidance of isolation” and one objective, “a settlement of 
outstanding disputes with Russia” in his book British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: 
                                                 
32
 Bernadotte Schmitt, England and Germany 1740-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1916) 3.  
33
 Ibid., 5-6. 
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From the Crimean War to First World War.34 According to Wilson, Grey was guided by fear, 
especially fear of Russia, and this compelled Grey to support France as the “only road to St. 
Petersburg went through Paris.”35 Wilson contended that British foreign policy was essentially at 
the service of France and Russia. It was, therefore, no surprise that Great Britain would choose to 
the enter World War I on the side of Entente. 
 Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson argued in their book, Britain and the Origins of the First 
World War that the growing Anglo-German tensions stemmed from what the British perceived to 
be a German clamor for war.36 Furthermore, they argued that Britain felt a sense of being 
blackmailed by the Germans and that tension was the price “Germans had to pay for their 
decision to embark on an active world policy at a time of British weakness.”37 They cite the 
Kaiser’s visit to Tangier in 1905 as confirming Grey’s suspicion of German aims. It became 
clear to Grey that an entente with France was necessary otherwise the French would fold in the 
face of German threats, and that would leave Britain isolated in the face of the German attack. 
Grey continued his predecessors’ work of warning Germany that Great Britain would not back 
down if France was attacked. But Steiner and Neilson also contend that “Grey was more 
concerned with maintaining the prestige of the Entente than with promoting a peaceful relation 
with Berlin.”38 Furthermore, Steiner and Neilson stated that Grey felt that German leadership 
was waiting to test its newfound power on the international stage and could only do so “through 
                                                 
34
 Keith Wilson, “Grey” in British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From the Crimean War to First World 
War, ed. Keith Wilson (New Hampshire: Croom Helm Ltd, 1987) 172. 
35
 Ibid., 180. 
36
 Steiner and Neilson’s book is actually the revised edition of an earlier work of the same name written by Steiner 
alone in 1977. The second edition, published in 2003, has an entirely new chapter on Russia. It also has an in-depth 
look at parliamentary influence, the British Empire, and military policy. However, Steiner’s basic argument remains 
the same. 
37
 Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003) 45. 
38
 Ibid. 
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the military conquest of Europe.”39 They maintained that Great Britain felt only Germany had 
the power to upset the status quo in Europe and it served Britain’s interests to “prevent the rise of 
an all-powerful European state.”40 Great Britain felt threatened by the rise of Germany in 
continental Europe during a period of British weakness and therefore perceived German actions 
to be hostile. This led to miscommunications between the countries and blustering for reasons of 
prestige and advantage, which included the naval arms race. 
 In 1999, Niall Ferguson argued that Britain did not need to enter the First World War at 
all in his book, The Pity of War. Ferguson contends that while Germany did start the war, the 
British leadership’s decision to join the war caused the war to go on much longer than it 
originally would have. British interests were not being threatened by the war and would not have 
been affect if the Germans had won. He considered Britain joining the war to be “nothing less 
than the greatest error in modern history.”41 Furthermore, he argued that if Britain had not joined 
the war many of twentieth century Europe’s problems could have been avoided. He lays fault for 
both World War II and the Russian Revolution at the feet of the British government. In 
Ferguson’s view had Germany won the First World War “the victorious Germans might have 
created a European Union, eight decades ahead of schedule.”42  
Looking at Anglo-German relations from an entirely different perspective is Frank 
McDonough with his book, The Conservative Party and Anglo-German Relations, 1905-1914. 
He stated that since the major power players in the foreign office in Britain were liberal, the 
conservatives were often overlooked. McDonough examined how the conservative party reacted 
to the growing Anglo-German tension and argues “it is possible to assess the continuing 
                                                 
39
 Ibid., 46. 
40
 Ibid., 189. 
41
 Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999) 462. 
42
 Ibid., 458. 
 16 
importance of ‘primary’ controversy to the study of Britain’s role in the outbreak of the First 
World War.”43 McDonough argued that conservatives in Great Britain were not actually anti-
German scaremongers who increased the tension between the two countries as has often been 
argued. 
 McDonough argued that discussion of Anglo-German tensions revolves around three 
main issues for the conservatives. The first was, obviously, the naval arms race. He states that 
conservatives supported the maintenance of the British naval supremacy and that there was a rift 
with Germany over its growing navy. But McDonough contended that conservatives also 
expressed concern over a possible French naval invasion in 1883, and the build up of the 
Japanese and Russian navies as well. What made the German navy different from the previous 
scares was that Germany was building a major naval fleet a few hundred miles away from 
Britain. McDonough argued that conservatives were very careful in their language not to express 
hostility towards the German people or government during the build up of the navy. Liberals, 
socialists and others in the British media often distorted conservative views to make them seem 
hostile to the Germans. He stated that conservative speeches showed very mild language in 
discussing the German navy and hostile comments “were surprisingly few and far between.”44 
 The second major issue for conservatives dealt with trade relations. Again, McDonough 
finds that the reaction of the conservative party was astonishingly mild.  The conservatives did 
push tariff reforms to increase revenue and trade, but McDonough found that it was not aimed at 
the Germans. The tariff reform went after French, American, Russian, and Canadian imports as 
well.45  
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The final issue that conservatives discussed concerning Anglo-German tensions revolves 
around conscription in the army and the role it would play in a war against Germany. This issue 
originally divided Conservatives into two camps: those who believed Great Britain’s survival 
depended on sea power and those who believed a military force would be needed to guarantee 
victory in future European wars. McDonough argued that, after 1905, the increasing German 
threat convinced many conservatives that only conscription into the British army would prevent 
Germany from capturing Europe. 46 
 McDonough’s study of conservative reactions to Anglo-German tensions is important 
because it noted a shift in policy from what the leading political power in Britain were doing and 
saying and what the minority party was doing. It is easy to lump the British during this period 
into one group, but McDonough clearly shows that British leaders were not unified in their 
dealings with Germany.47  
 While slightly less contentious than the historiography concerning Germany’s role in the 
origins of the First World War, historians still have conflicting views over minor issues 
concerning the role of Britain. Most historians would agree that Britain was trying to maintain 
the status quo in Europe because it benefited their interests, but there are several different 
theories as to what actually caused the tension. 
 
Section III: Eyre Crowe 
While dozens of books and articles have been written discussing Anglo-German tensions prior to 
the First World War from either perspective, much less has been written about Eyre Crowe.  A 
pivotal figure in the British Foreign Office during the two world wars, few books has been 
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focused on him. The extent of Crowe’s influence and therefore the extent to which he holds the 
key to questions concerning British attitudes towards Germany remain controversial amongst 
historians.  Sidney Bradshaw Fay stated that “Crowe appears to have been accepted as an 
infallible authority on Germany” in the Foreign Office.48 German Historian Ludwig Reiners 
considered Crowe to be Germany’s most bitter enemy.49 
The first real historical arguments about Crowe came in 1973. Richard Cosgrove argues 
that Crowe had a limited influence on the diplomatic policy in Great Britain, and that his position 
in the British Foreign Office has been misinterpreted. He claimed “Sir Eyre Crowe was credited 
by historians with enormous surreptitious influence.”50 Cosgrove states that historians were 
wrong when they argued Crowe was responsible for the hostility towards Germany after 1906 in 
Britain. He claimed that the officials in government were concerned that Germany challenged 
British interests around the globe, which is what caused Grey and others to be concerned about 
the German threat. Furthermore, Cosgrove argued that Crowe did not have easy access to the 
officials in the government, so he had little opportunity to give them advice. The only way 
Crowe could express his theories to Grey and others was through memorandums, which 
Cosgrove claimed symbolized Crowe’s marginalization from the rest of government. In addition, 
Cosgrove argued that Grey was wary of Crowe and hesitant to take his suggestions. 51 
Historian Keith Wilson agrees with Cosgrove, in his book The Policy of the Entente, 
stating his memorandum “has been elevated by many historians to the status of State Paper. It 
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was in fact no such thing.”52 Additionally, the memorandum was considered to be anti-German 
when it was, according to Wilson a “confused and self-contradictory piece of work.”53 Wilson 
maintained that Crowe’s memorandum alternated between hypotheses and was so vague and 
confusing that the memorandum could hardly be considered a valid argument. Wilson also 
claimed that Crowe left out facts and events dealing with Anglo-German relations that were 
easily ascertained. 54 
Henry Kissinger disagrees with Wilson in Diplomacy. Kissinger applauded the 1907 
Memorandum stating it “was at a level of analysis never reached by any document of post-
Bismarck Germany.”55 Furthermore, he argued it “leaves no reasonable doubt” that Great Britain 
ultimately joined the Triple Entente to stop German hegemony in Europe.  
 The most extensive work written on Crowe was written by his daughter Sybil and 
published in 1993. Our Ablest Public Servant: Sir Eyre Crowe, 1864-1925, depicted Crowe as 
hardworking and intelligent contributor to the British Foreign Office. Sybil Crowe gives detailed 
accounts of her father’s work with chapters covering every major event that happened during 
Crowe’s time with the foreign office. Like most biographies though, the book assumes Crowe 
had influence and authority in the foreign office without giving much evidence to justify the 
assumption. Sybil Crowe’s book is the best source for events and opinions dealing with Eyre 
Crowe inside the Foreign office. 
 Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, in the British Origins of the First World War, are not 
quite as critical of Crowe. They argued Crowe was convinced that the German government “was 
determined to achieve a new world position and this would be done through the military 
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conquest of Europe.”56 While they concurred with Cosgrove that Crowe had little personal 
contact with Grey, they argued that Crowe’s analysis of German policy confirmed Grey’s own 
opinion and provided a logical basis for Grey’s views. Steiner and Neilson stated that Crowe’s 
opinion did not shape policy but rather confirmed it was going in the right direction. They 
claimed the problem with Crowe and the foreign office was that his policy of no negotiations 
with Germany and closer ties to France was problematic to many people in Grey’s cabinet.57 
 While historians have questioned the personal influence of Crowe on the British Foreign 
Office, few can doubt that his memorandum had some affect on Anglo-German politics in the 
lead up to the First World War. Just how much influence his memorandum had on British and 
German politics remains to be seen. 
 In conclusion, the various historiographies on Anglo-German political tensions prior to 
the First World War vary depending on the country and the historian. Each brings a new and 
innovative perspective to the underlying causes of World War I. The historiography of British 
underlying political tensions and the importance of Eyre Crowe is limited, but it speaks volumes 
about the importance of looking at Anglo-German relations in context with Crowe’s 
memorandum 
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Chapter II: Eyre Crowe 
The Man, the Myth and the Memorandum 
 
Sir Eyre Crowe is largely an enigma in early twentieth century politics. A German born Briton 
working for the British Foreign Office, Crowe has been both demonized and glorified by 
historians. He is perhaps best known for his 1907 “Memorandum on the Present State of British 
Relations with France and Germany”, although he had a long and illustrious career with the 
British Foreign Office.  
 But who was Sir Eyre Crowe and how much of an influence did he really have? What did 
his 1907 Memorandum really say, and has it been blown out of proportion by historians looking 
to place the blame for WWI on the British? This chapter will dissect Eyre Crowe and his origins, 
his influence in the British Foreign Office, and his 1907 Memorandum on the Present State of 
British Relations with France and Germany. 
 
Section I: Who Was Eyre Crowe? 
Eyre Alexander Barby Wichart Crowe was born in Leipzig, Germany on 30th July 1864. He was 
the third son to Sir Joseph Archer Crowe. Joseph Crowe had aspired to be a painter like his 
brother. His father Eyre Evans Crowe, however, decided one painter was quite enough in the 
family and convinced Joseph to go into journalism. At the age of 18, Joseph Crowe joined his 
father working for the Morning Chronicle in London. A few years later, Joseph was transferred 
to the Daily News and sent on assignment in Paris. Upon the outbreak of the 1848 revolutions in 
Europe, Joseph began to take an interest in Foreign Affairs. By 1850, Joseph was appointed the 
sub-editor for foreign affairs for the Daily News but two years later he was dismissed from the 
newspaper. Joseph continued to write during these years as he struggled to find regular 
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employment. In 1860, a friend persuaded Joseph to offer his services to the government. He was 
quickly sent to Germany to report on events there for Lord John Russell. Russell was so pleased 
with Joseph’s work that he offered Joseph the position as British Consul-General at Leipzig. 
Joseph became close friends with Duke Ernest of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha during his prior years in 
Germany working for the Daily News. Upon his return to Germany in 1860, Joseph often visited 
the Duke, and it was during one of his visits he met Asta von Barby.58  
Barby was the eldest daughter of Baron Gustav von Barby and Evelina von Ribbentrop of 
Germany.59 Ribbentrop was considered one of the great beauties of her day and an accomplished 
singer. Joseph described her as “one of the brightest and most accomplished women whom it had 
been my fortune to meet.”60 When Baron von Barby died, Evelina married Otto von Holtzendorff. 
Holtzendorff was a distinguished lawyer with liberal views. The two would go one to have six 
more children. Asta and her sister, Wanda, had a very close relationship with their stepfather and 
half-siblings.61  
Joseph Crowe became smitten with the “young, dark-haired, dark-eyed vivacious” Asta 
and they married a year later.62 Asta was charming, intelligent, and cultivated with a determined 
personality. She learned English quickly and spent many years correcting the grammar and 
spelling of Eyre. Joseph and Asta had six surviving children: Evan, Percy, Eyre, Victoria, 
Mildred and Vera.  Eyre was named after his Grandfather and his uncle, the painter Eyre Crowe. 
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His second name, Alexander, was “in honour of his godmother the Duchess Alexandra of Saxe-
Coburg-Gotha, the wife of Duke Ernest”.63 
 Eyre Crowe grew up in Düsseldorf, but the family spent summers in Gamburg in Baden 
visiting Wanda, her husband Dr. Carl Gerhardt and their children. Crowe studied both in 
Düsseldorf and Berlin before moving to Britain in 1882. He lived with his brother Percy and the 
two attended King’s College. Money problems plagued the Crowe family, and Eyre quit King’s 
College in 1883 as it was too expensive. Instead under the suggestion of one of his father’s friend, 
Eyre joined his father in Paris to improve his French. Upon his return to Britain in October, 
Crowe attended Scoones Cramming Establishment where he did very well. He attended another 
semester at Scoones before going to the University College, where he was asked to join the 
debating society.64 
 In March of 1885, Crowe took the Foreign Office Examination for a job that had just 
become available. He came in first in German, Constitutional History, Geography and Greek but 
was hampered by Arithmetic and Orthography. Crowe came in second being beaten by only 6 
marks, and lost out on the position. Lord Granville wrote to Joseph Crowe stating that he would 
keep Eyre’s name on his list if another position came available. Two months later a position 
opened up and Crowe entered the British Foreign Office in 1885 at the age of 21.65 
 Crowe left a distinct impression in the Foreign Office. He “had little patience with the 
snobberies and social preoccupations of many of his contemporaries.” His peers often said when 
Crowe was angry he spoke English with a German accent. Fellow diplomat Harold Nicolson 
described Crowe as being a “man of extreme violence and extreme gentleness…He was so 
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human. He was so superhuman. Yet here, if ever, was man of truth and vigour.”66 Crowe was 
meticulous, distrustful of outsiders, brilliant and exceedingly arrogant. “He had ‘an unfortunate 
habit of indicating to the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues in the Cabinet, that they were not 
only ill-informed but also weak and silly.’”67 Despite Crowe’s arrogance and controlling nature 
he quickly rose in the Foreign Office first in the Consular, then the African Department. By 1906, 
he became a senior clerk and the supervising head of the Western Department. In 1912 he was 
promoted to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Crowe’s arrogance did 
not always work in his favor, though. By 1914, it was widely thought in the Foreign Office that 
Crowe would succeed Arthur Nicolson as Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. But Lord Bertie wrote Crowe “was insubordinate and insolent to [Sir Edward] Grey who 
has decided that his [Crowe’s] appointment to succeed Nicolson is impossible.”68 In 1920 Crowe 
was given the position as Permanent Under-Secretary anyhow and it was a position he would 
hold until his death in 1925. 
Crowe often visited the European continent staying in Paris or Baden. In 1903, Crowe 
married his German cousin, Clema von Bonin, the widowed daughter of his uncle Professor 
Gerhardt. They were both cousin’s to Henning von Holtzendorff, the future Chief of the German 
Naval Staff, and the Crowe’s corresponded with him often. Holtzendorff was one of Admiral 
Tirpitz’s main critics. The naval attaché in Paris, Rudolf Seigel, later became one of Crowe’s 
brothers-in-law. These connections would cause Crowe grief as he was often under attack by 
other members of the government and the press for these family relations. 69 The press neglected 
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to note that Crowe’s older brother Percy, who became a colonel in the British military, and 
Percy’s son who died at sea during WWI served in the British Navy . Eyre and Clema had four 
children all with the middle name Eyre; his three daughters were Asta, Una, and Sibyl and his 
son was Eric. His youngest daughter Sibyl became the leading- and only biographer of her 
father.70 
Crowe’s position in the Foreign Office gave him the opportunity to influence Anglo-
German relations. The Foreign Office papers are littered with minutes and notes by Crowe. Zara 
Steiner stated “There is hardly a major dispatch on any German question which does not carry 
one of his minutes and many French dispatches contain briefer but equally penetrating comments 
by the senior clerk.”71 Crowe was not anti-German; he admired German achievements and 
contributions to European society. Crowe was well versed in German history, economics, 
literature, philosophy and military. He read all three volumes of Karl Marx’s Das Kapital.  But 
Crowe had no love for the German government. His father was critical of Wilhelm II and felt 
that he would be the death of German liberalism.72 Crowe’s grandfather and uncle had similar 
views and Crowe grew up in an environment where “literature, politics and the arts were the 
current talk of the day.”73 It should be no surprise that Eyre Crowe would be deeply distrustful of 
the German government as well.  
 
Section II: Crowe’s Influence in the Foreign Office 
To understand fully the influence of Crowe’s 1907 memorandum, a detailed look at Crowe’s 
influence in the British Foreign Office is necessary. Until the late 1960s, historians had not 
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looked closely at Crowe’s actual influence in the Foreign Office. It was assumed that he shared 
the same amount of influence as anyone else working for Edward Grey. 
  In 1967, Richard Cosgrove did an in-depth study of Eyre Crowe and his influence in the 
Foreign Office. As stated, Cosgrove argued that Crowe had remarkably little influence at all. 
Cosgrove argued that Crowe’s influence had been greatly exaggerated because of the sheer 
volume of minute-writing he had done on documents in the Foreign Office. Cosgrove claimed 
that the “large number of minutes from his pen was a result of his [Crowe’s] personal isolation 
from the foreign secretary. Where as others could make verbal suggestions to Sir Edward Grey, 
Crowe rarely saw him in person and had to be content with the written word.” 74 While it is 
impossible to determine how much face-to-face time Crowe had with Grey, Crowe’s influence 
can hardly be discredited. Almost every member of the Foreign Office wrote minute notes on 
documents and these documents were consistently circulated. Cosgrove could just have as easily 
argued that any number of officials did not have face-to-face time with Grey because they wrote 
lengthy minute notes on documents. In fact, it is in these minute notes that it becomes crystal 
clear that Crowe did have a wide reaching influence in the Foreign Office. Furthermore unlike 
verbal conversations, which can be easily forgotten, these minute notes were readily accessible 
to everyone and could be reexamined at a moments notice. 
Every historical document has its own drawbacks and minute notes are not any different. 
Cosgrove states minute notes were “observations destined very often to be discussed orally with 
a higher authority, liable to oral correction which might not appear on paper and sometimes 
provoking disagreement which was only casually expressed.”75 Minutes were written on 
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memorandums, notes between various members of the Foreign Office, transcripts of speeches 
and virtually every other type of document used in the Foreign Office. They were not, however, 
the same as state papers or important documents; they were simply an addendum to them.  
Crowe’s notes on Foreign Office documents are innumerable. There seems to hardly be a 
letter, memo, or speech without a minute note attached with Crowe’s initials. While not every 
note can be examined in the length of this paper, a few significant notes can easily show the 
importance of Crowe to the Foreign Office. The two men Crowe worked under as a clerk, and 
then assistant, are prime examples. Crowe worked under Sir Charles Hardinge from 1906 to 
1910 and Sir Arthur Nicolson from 1910 to 1916. Both Permanent Under-Secretaries for Foreign 
Affairs found Crowe’s opinions insightful. 
Often agreeing with Crowe’s assessments was Sir Arthur Nicolson. On a note sent from 
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey in 1910 discussing an upcoming naval agreement with 
Germany, Crowe wrote minutes claiming that Germany was only trying to make the agreement 
so that it would preclude Britain from intervening in Germany’s affairs with France and Russia. 
Nicolson stated “Sir Eyre Crowe’s minute is an admirable summary of what has passed and 
merits the most careful consideration. I entirely agree with his views….”76  Nicolson repeats this 
sentiment in a telegram from the Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey during the Agadir crisis, 
stating “I quite agree with Eyre Crowe. And we should certainly not give the German 
Gov[ernmen]t any indication as to what line we may follow[.]”77 Considerable other minute 
notes have Nicolson agreeing with Crowe’s assessments.  This furthered Crowe’s opinions and 
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status in the Foreign Office. As his direct subordinate, Nicolson had contact with Edward Grey 
on a daily basis. 
According to Sibyl Crowe, Charles Hardinge never took a liking to Crowe as Nicolson 
had. Hardinge “watched with jealousy and alarm the formidable and unique position of authority 
which he [Crowe] was beginning to build up for himself.”78 Hardinge was a soft-spoken man by 
nature and did not like Crowe’s outspoken tendencies. This was especially difficult for Hardinge 
as Crowe expressed his opinions without checking to see whether Hardinge agreed with him first. 
Hardinge went as far as to circulate a rumor that Crowe “was a man ‘of unsound judgement.’”79 
Despite his personal dislike for Crowe, even Hardinge admitted when Crowe was right. Writing 
after a lengthy minute note by Crowe discussing problems with the building of the Berlin-
Baghdad Railroad, Hardinge stated “I agree generally with all the above minutes, but wish to 
point out the change which has taken place in the attitude of Germany…”80 While Hardinge and 
Crowe did not get along well, Hardinge was balanced enough to recognize when he believed 
Crowe’s opinions were right. Additionally, agreeing with Crowe furthered Crowe’s status in the 
Foreign Office, as Sir Edward Grey read all of the minute notes himself. 
Furthermore, the minute notes written by Edward Grey show that he took Crowe’s 
opinions very seriously.  In the minute notes on Crowe’s 1907 Memorandum on the Present State 
of British Relations with France and Germany, Grey wrote “This Memorandum by Mr. Crowe is 
most valuable… The whole Memorandum contains information and reflections, which should be 
carefully studied.” Grey also said that the “Memorandum should go to the Prime Minister, Lord 
                                                 
78
 Sibyl Crowe and Edward T. Corp. Our Ablest Public Servant: Sir Eyre Crowe, 1864-1925.(Braunton  Devon, 
England: Merlin Books, 1993) 98-99. 
79
 Ibid. 
80
 Sir Charles Hardinge, Minute note on No. 343 Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, April 10th 1910 in British 
Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. Vol. VI, Anglo-German tension armaments and negotiation: 
1907-12, ed. G. P. Gooch  and Harold William Vazeille Temperley (London: H.M.S.O., 1928) 451. 
 29 
Ripon, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Morley, Mr. Haldane, with my comment upon it.”81 This showed that 
Grey found Crowe’s opinions and insights so important that he wanted them passed on to the 
Prime Minister. In the minute notes on a letter between Grey and Sir G. Buchanan, Grey wrote 
under Crowe’s notes “The points raised by Sir Eyre Crowe merit serious consideration, and 
doubtless the Cabinet will review the situation.”82 By Grey’s own admission, Crowe’s opinions 
and insights were valuable and were discussed by the British Cabinet and Foreign Office.  
 Grey also called on Crowe for his opinions in certain matters. Written on minutes note 
about the Baghdad to Berlin Railroad and the Hakki Pasha, Grey wrote “I think I had better see 
Hakki Pasha….I should like to discuss this with Sir E. Crowe and Mr. Parker.”83 Furthermore, in 
a minute note discussing the Anglo-German convention, Crowe wrote “Sir. E. Grey has spoken 
to me about this, and has asked me to prepare a revised draft [of the Anglo-German 
Convention.]”84 In the minute notes of a private letter discussing the convention, Grey wrote “Mr. 
Harcourt and Sir J. Anderson should be asked to come to discuss this and the other points in 
these papers with Sir A. Nicolson, Sir E. Crowe and myself at the F[oreign] O[ffice] on some 
morning in this week.”85 This suggests that Crowe visited Grey on foreign matters quite often. 
 In addition, Grey trusted Crowe to write important documents on these matters. On 
another of Crowe’s memorandums dealing with island of Timor and Germany, Grey wrote “I 
think Sir Eyre Crowe’s 2nd proposal for dealing with Mr. Gilmore can be adopted; if necessary 
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we might go a little further…”86 This indicates that not only did Sir Edward Grey take Crowe’s 
opinions to heart, but that he implemented Crowe’s proposals into Britain’s policy initiatives. 
That is hardly the work of someone who could be considered unimportant in the British Foreign 
Office. Grey had a significant amount of trust in the Assistant Undersecretary. He was in no way 
distanced from the Foreign Secretary as Cosgrove erroneously asserted. Crowe was a valuable 
member of the Foreign Office and his opinions and observations were taken as seriously as any 
other members of the Foreign Office. 
 
Section III: The 1907 Memorandum 
Crowe’s 1907 “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and 
Germany” has become a hotly contested document in the annals of diplomatic history. As 
indicated many historians, such as Keith Wilson, have argued that the importance of the 
Memorandum has been blown out of proportion, and the Memorandum in no way reflected the 
views or actions of the British Foreign Office. Others, such as Friedrich Thimme, argued that 
Britain’s entry into World War I on the side of  France and Russia was “the logical consequence 
and continuation of the Memorandum.”87 But what does the 1907 Memorandum really say? Is it 
a decidedly anti-German piece spurred on by a writer who was biased against the Germans as 
Ludwig Reiners contended? Is it a blueprint for future British foreign policy? 
 If Crowe was biased against the Germans there is little proof of that in the 1907 
Memorandum. In fact, Crowe spoke highly of the Germans. He wrote, “It cannot for a moment 
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be questioned that the mere existence and healthy activity of a powerful Germany is an 
undoubted blessing to the world… The world would be unmeasurably the poorer if everything 
that is specifically associated with German character, German ideas and German methods were 
to cease having power and influence.”88 Crowe had a significant amount of respect for the 
German people. He felt German ideas and methods had contributed considerably to the rest of 
the world. Crowe felt that England and Germany benefited from each other and had a special 
bond. He wrote, “For England particularly, intellectual and moral kinship creates a sympathy and 
appreciation of what is best in the German mind[.]”89 Crowe felt that as long as Germany 
competed for “intellectual and moral leadership of the world” then England would applaud the 
effort and the two countries would get along fine. In addition, Crowe stated that England did not 
want Germany reduced to a weaker power, as this could lead to a “Franco-Russian predominance 
equally, if not more, formidable to the British Empire.”90 Crowe felt a strong Germany was 
important to offset the powers of France and Russia, especially after they had signed an alliance. 
 At the same time Crowe was critical of the path Germany was taking. His 1907 
Memorandum seriously examined Germany’s history and how Germany came in conflict with 
England. Crowe started the Memorandum by discussing the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. 
He argued that the French were seeking an agreement with England as a way to strengthen their 
hand against Germany after Russia’s collapse against Japan in the Russo-Japanese War. France 
feared she was in “danger of finding herself alone face to face with her great enemy 
[Germany].”91 The decline of Russia “deprived France of the powerful support which alone had 
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hitherto enabled her to stand up to Germany in the political area on terms of equality.”92 After 
France’s humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian war in 1871, France had been unable to feel 
secure against Germany without another country providing support either politically or militarily. 
Without the possibility of Russian aggression on her borders, Germany felt it was in a position of 
power over France. This power was “rudely checked by the unexpected intelligence that France 
had come to an understanding with England.”93 Crowe argued, from that moment Germany 
wanted to drive a wedge between England and France. 
 Crowe contended that England’s foreign policy was determined because of her 
geographical situation “as an island State with vast oversea colonies and dependencies, whose 
existence and survival as an independent community are inseparably bound up with the 
possession of preponderant sea power.” 94 Crowe stated that sea power was more important than 
land power because sea power was easily moveable and it made England “the neighbor of every 
country accessible by sea.” 95 Because of this, Crowe asserted that England had an interest in the 
independence of other nations. England had to be the natural protector of weaker countries and 
was consequently the natural enemy of any country threatening the sovereignty of another. In 
addition, Crowe stated that while every other country would prefer to be the supreme sea-power, 
if that could not the case, these countries would prefer “England hold that power than any other 
state.”96 Furthermore, England historically believed in having a balance of power in Europe. 
Crowe argued that England maintained that balance by throwing their might to oppose the 
political tyranny of the strongest state or group of states against the weaker ones. It is for this 
reason that England determine whether or not Germany is aiming at a political hegemony in 
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Europe at the impairment of the other nations through schemes of expansion and political 
maneuvers.  This is what Crowe spent the bulk of the 1907 Memorandum discussing. 97 
 Crowe started his look at German political policy by discussing Prussian imperialism. 
Crowe argued that Prussia set out to “turn a small State into a big one….”98 To do that Prussia 
felt it needed a stronger military force, a bigger territory and more inhabitants. After Prussia 
became Germany and found their place in the great powers of Europe, Germany became aware 
of “the true position of countries such as England, the United States, France and even the 
Netherlands, whose political influence” extended well beyond their own borders and across the 
seas.99 Crowe argued that though Germany found a place as the leading power on the Europe; it 
then felt it must become a world power. This thinking was consistent with the ideas of Prussian 
Imperialism and finding a German “place in the sun.” Crowe stated this thinking is what pushed 
German political policy to gain colonies. As long as Germany did not try to gain these colonies 
by schemes of a subversive nature, then they would not come into an armed conflict with 
England; as “England seeks no quarrels, and will never give Germany cause for legitimate 
offence.”100 
 Crowe then evaluates the last twenty years of Anglo-German relations and noted that the 
“German Governments have never ceased reproaching British Cabinets with want of 
friendliness” but that Germany launched numerous colonial and maritime enterprises which 
brought the two countries into conflict. Crowe stated these acts “all have in common this feature 
that they were opened acts of direct and unmistakable hostility to England ….”Additionally, 
Germany made demands to other countries, as well as England, and would use excessive shows 
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of force to convince them to acquiesce to German whims. Crowe stated that Britain accepted 
these actions from Germany to avoid quarreling with them and maintain “cordial relations.” 101  
But continuing actions of this nature would affect Anglo-German relations, as almost every 
German demand had been met. Crowe likened Germany’s foreign policy to blackmail: 
 The action of Germany towards this country since 1890 might be likened not 
inappropriately to that of a professional blackmailer, whose extortions are wrung 
from his victims by the threat of some vague and dreadful consequences in case of 
a refusal. To give way to the blackmailer’s menaces enriches him, but it has long 
been proved by uniformed experience that, although this may secure for the 
victim temporary peace, it is certain to lead to renewed molestation and higher 
demands after ever-shortening periods of amicable forbearance.102 
 
To Crowe, England had been more than forthcoming in giving Germany what it wanted, but he 
found Germany continued to demand more. Crowe found that there had been Anglo-German 
opposition but it had been caused by the “one-sided aggressiveness” of Germany. England, 
Crowe stated, had been more than conciliatory and had given numerous concessions to Germany.   
Crowe contended that “Germany is deliberately following a policy which is essentially 
opposed to vital British interests, and that an armed conflict cannot in the long run be averted,” 
unless England was willing to sacrifice its own self-interests to Germany and lose her place as a 
great power. He asserted that Germany was heading towards a political hegemony in Europe, at 
the expense of England and the other great powers. But Crowe is unsure whether Germany had 
set out on this path. Crowe offered two hypotheses: Either Germany was aiming at political 
hegemony and maritime power at the expense of England and the other powers; or that 
Germany’s foreign policy was clear from any clear-cut ambition and is really “the expression of 
a vague, confused, and unpractical statesmanship not fully realizing its own drift.”103 Either 
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Germany was aiming to dominate Europe or Germany was simply promoting it’s own interests 
not really knowing what it was playing at. Crowe noted that the second hypothesis was not 
particularly flattering to the German Government. But that it could be the temperament of the 
German Kaiser that was causing the “erratic, domineering, and often frankly aggressive spirit” of 
German foreign policy.104 
Crowe contended that the British Government need not determine which of the two 
hypotheses was actually correct because at any point the first hypothesis may unite with the 
second. To Crowe it did not matter whether Germany had set out on this course of action or if it 
had simply stumbled upon it; either way Germany was heading towards the same thing. Crowe 
stated that England should have no quarrel with German expansion nor should it oppose the 
German Navy because Germany had a natural right to both.  England needed a strong Germany 
as a way of balancing the powers of Russia and France. But if Germany continued on the path 
that ran counter to British interests, then Britain would either have to go to war to maintain their 
world power status or sacrifice their self-interests and lose its status as an independent great 
power in Europe. 105  
Crowe’s 1907 Memorandum provided valuable insight into Anglo-German relations for 
the British Foreign Office. It clearly lays out that Germany was aiming at a political hegemony 
in Europe which came in conflict with British interests. Whether the Germans did this 
purposefully or not was not relevant according to Crowe. The two countries were on a path 
towards war unless Britain or Germany was willing to back down. Furthermore, it showed that 
Germany’s foreign policy was built around demands, brute shows of force, and blackmail, none 
of which Britain could continue to deal with in the future. Has the importance of the 1907 
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Memorandum been blown out of proportion as Keith Wilson asserted? No, the memorandum 
marked a shift in the way British Foreign Policy would handle German relations in the future. 
But it was also not a blueprint for future British Foreign Policy either. Crowe made no 
suggestions about how to handle Germany. He simply asserted that based on the current path the 
two countries were taking, war was likely. Of course, Crowe could have hardly known the 
circumstances that would bring on World War I in 1907. Nonetheless, he was correct.  
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Chapter III: 
Crises in Morocco  
 
The context in which Crowe wrote his memorandum is significant, because it underscores the 
arguments about Germany Crowe was making. While the memorandum circulated the British 
Foreign Office on the 1st of January 1907, Crowe wrote it in 1905-1906, during the height of the 
First Moroccan Crisis. It is only logical that the First and Second Moroccan crises would fully 
illustrate the underlying hostility in British Foreign policy towards Germany, which happened 
after Crowe’s memorandum circulated. 
Crowe argued that Germany’s foreign policy was built around demands, brute shows of 
force, and blackmail. The Moroccan crises epitomize exactly the kinds of brute force and 
blackmail Germany was willing to use to gain control in Europe. Furthermore, Crowe stated that 
Britain could not continue to deal with Germany in the future as it had in the past. After the 
memorandum circulated, Sir Edward Grey and the foreign office took a much harsher stand in 
relation to German government’s politics.  Rather than trying to get France to compromise, the 
British Government stood behind France and tried to force Germany to back down.  
 
Section I: The First Moroccan Crisis 
In March of 1905 in the middle of his annual Mediterranean cruise Kaiser Wilhelm II stopped off 
at Tangiers, a port city in northern Morocco. While there he declared that “The object of my visit 
to Tangier is to make it known that I am determined to…safeguard efficaciously the interests of 
Germany in Morocco for I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign.”106  The 
Kaiser proclaimed Morocco was an independent country in which no other country should have 
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special rights or a sphere of influence, as far as Germany was concerned. The Kaiser’s stop had 
been suggested to him by German leadership in the hopes of producing an international crisis 
that the German government could exploit. The plan worked perfectly; the proclamation created 
a serious diplomatic crisis in Europe.  
 The Kaiser made this proclamation in the face of the 1904 Anglo-French convention, 
which had given France the right to preserve order and provide assistance in Morocco in order to 
protect French interests there. In other words, the Anglo-French convention gave France a sphere 
of influence in Morocco.107 This act violated the 1880 Madrid convention, which had given 
favored nation status and protection rights over Morocco to all the countries in attendance at the 
conference.108  When the Kaiser returned to Germany in April, he demanded a review of the 
Madrid Convention by all the countries that had participated; even after the French Foreign 
Minister, Théophile Delcassé, offered a bilateral settlement no fewer than three times.  
The German government’s motivation for this proclamation was simple; the German 
government felt slighted by France. The 1904 Anglo-French convention was hardly the first time 
a treaty had been overturned by two major European powers. Germany had little to gain in 
Morocco, even in regards to trade. Germany could have allowed France to have a sphere of 
interest in Morocco and it would not have changed anything for Germany. But to gain a sphere 
of influence in Morocco, France had basically bribed Great Britain, Italy, and Spain; all of which 
had interests in Morocco and legitimate historical claims to having a sphere of influence there. 
France, however, neglected to discuss the proceedings with Germany. In a 1904 memorandum a 
German Foreign Official, Baron von Holstein, wrote that “Germany would suffer great injury 
owing to the French monopoly. Even more alarming would be the injury to Germany’s prestige, 
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if we sat still whilst German interests were being dealt with without our taking a part.”109 The 
German leadership saw France’s influence in Morocco as challenge to their great power status in 
Europe. Additionally, the German government felt that France slighted Germany by not 
discussing the matter them. 
Furthermore, Germany saw the opportunity to humiliate France by challenging France 
over Morocco. France’s closest ally, Russia, had been humiliated by the Japanese in the Russo-
Japanese war and would be unlikely to give support to France. Germany believed that Great 
Britain would be unwilling to enter a confrontation over Morocco. Without Russia or Great 
Britain to assist them, Germany believed the French government would surrender to German 
demands. That Germany rejected three offers to settle the Moroccan problem from France further 
proved that Germany cared more about humiliating France than it did about their minimal 
interests in Morocco. German Chancellor, Bernhard von Bülow, stated in a letter to the Kaiser 
before his trip “Your Majesty’s visit to Tangier will embarrass M. Delcassé, traverse his schemes, 
and further our business interests in Morocco.”110 Germany also thought the conflict could drive 
a wedge between Britain and France and their newly formed entente.111 
The relations between Britain and France were already on strained ground.  With the 
Russian military and navy having been decimated by the Japanese, France had sent numerous 
appeals to Great Britain to pressure their ally, Japan, into ending the Russo-Japanese war. The 
British Foreign Office ignored the French appeals as a weakened Russia could not endanger 
British interests in India. To the British, a weak Russia was better than a weak Germany. 
Additionally, Delcassé misinterpreted the British Foreign Office’s intentions when British 
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officials had told the French ambassador that Britain and France should “concert their policy.”112 
The British Foreign Office had been warning France not to make an agreement with Germany 
behind the British government’s back. Delcassé took the message to mean that the British 
wanted an alliance with France, and he encouraged his superiors to stand up to Germany.113 
Ultimately, the French gave into German demands. The nations arranged a conference for 
January 1906 in Algeciras to discuss the problem of influence in Morocco. Furthermore, 
Delcassé resigned from office in June of 1905.114  
Initially, Germany seemed to come out the winner of the First Moroccan Crisis. Germany 
had forced agreement to a conference to discuss the sphere of influence over Morocco. The 
German government had managed to get the French Foreign Minister, an avid Germanophobe, to 
resign from office. France and Britain seemed to be at odds with each other over how to handle 
the crisis. Germany seemed to have succeeded in all of their goals. But by the time the Algeciras 
conference came to fruition the diplomatic momentum had turned against Germany.115 
In December of 1905, the Liberal party came into power in Great Britain bringing with it 
a new perspective in the Foreign Office. Sir Edward Grey was made the new Secretary of State 
for Foreign affairs and he felt promoting the Anglo-French entente was in Britain’s best interests. 
The German ambassador in London, Count Paul von Metternich, stated as much in a letter to 
Bülow on January 3rd 1906, “The Entente with France and the removal of the old quarrels were 
very greatly welcomed in England, and they wish to keep to it and run no risks with it.”116 Grey 
gave France the full support of the British at the Algeciras conference regardless of the issues at 
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hand. According to Metternich, Grey believed “the British people would not stand France being 
involved in a war with Germany … and that, if it happened, any British Government, whether 
Conservative or Liberal, would be forced to help France.”117 This was something the previous 
British government had never made clear to France or Germany. Nevertheless, this support from 
Grey did not actually commit Britain to go to war. In fact several members of the British Cabinet 
were not informed about these discussions at all.118 The British government was making it clear 
Britain supported France in this crisis, but Britain did not actually commit to sending troops nor 
did it ever put the army and navy on ready in case war broke out. Grey and the British Foreign 
Office were claiming they would go to war without actually intending to go to war over Morocco. 
From the beginning of the conference, Germany was isolated at the bargaining table. 
Germany did not receive support from Italy or the United States as Germany had expected. The 
only support Germany obtained was from their traditional ally, Austria-Hungary, and Morocco. 
On the other hand, France received the full backing of not only Italy and the United States, but 
Great Britain, Russia and Spain as well. France was given a protectorate over Morocco with a 
few exceptions in which political control reverted to Spain.  The Kaiser’s proclamation that 
Morocco should be considered an independent country under the Sultan was confirmed but the 
proclamation meant very little. Germany went into the Algeciras conference feeling as they 
would be victorious over France, only to come out as the loser. 
 Not only did France get Morocco, Germany’s attitude during the event also made Great 
Britain wary of German intentions. Germany had been unwilling to compromise with France 
even though Germany was standing on shaky diplomatic ground. Germany had little if any 
historical claim in Morocco.  Germany’s presumption of power made Britain wonder what 
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Germany was doing. Britain became suspicious of German motivations pushing them to 
reinforce ties with France.  Frank Lascelles, the British Ambassador in Germany, stated in letter 
dated September 1906 “The result of the Conference was certainly not satisfactory to Germany. 
She had found herself in a position of almost complete isolation, and the understanding between 
England and France had been greatly strengthened.”119 Instead of driving a wedge between 
France and Great Britain, Germany had managed to push the two countries closer together.  
It is in this context that Crowe wrote his “Memorandum on the Present State of British 
Relations with France and Germany”. Crowe’s correct interpretations of the First Moroccan 
Crisis lent further credence to his arguments in the Memorandum.  Germany’s actions in 
Morocco clearly show what Crowe meant when he argued that Germany would use excessive 
shows of force to convince countries to acquiesce to German whims. Furthermore, Crowe saw 
what Germany was trying to do with regard to Morocco. The aim of the German leadership 
during First Moroccan Crisis was to drive a wedge between Britain and France so that Germany 
would be in a position of power over France. Crowe stated “The object of nipping in the bud the 
young friendship between France and England was to be attained by using as a stalking-horse 
those very interests in Morocco which the [German] Imperial Chancellor had, barely a year 
before, publicly declared to be in no way imperiled.”120 Crowe argued that German leader were 
trying to split France and England by using the Moroccan Crisis after saying Germany had no 
problems with France in Morocco just a year prior.  
Crowe noted that the German leadership had carefully chosen Morocco to test the Anglo-
French entente. The German government had believed that Britain would not lend military 
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assistance to France. But just in case, German leaders had “taken to inflame French opinion by 
representing through the channels of a venal press that England was in her own selfish interest 
trying to push France into a war with Germany, so revealing the secret intentions which had 
inspired her [Britain] in seeking the entente.”121 Crowe argued Germany was playing both sides 
of the coin in regards to the Anglo-French agreements. If Britain did not offer militarily 
assistance to France, German could play on French fears of a war , which France was unprepared 
for to get France to acquiesce to German demands. If Britain did offer military assistance to 
France it was because Britain secretly had wanted a war with Germany and was using the Anglo-
French entente to drag France into a war.  
In addition, Crowe was wary of the German government’s deceitful attempts to gain 
colonies. Crowe believed these attempts would bring England into an armed conflict with 
Germany. The crisis in Morocco had been a subversive scheme from the outset. Germany made a 
conflict where there was none in the attempts to drive a wedge between Britain and France. 
France being ill-prepared for any war, and with the military defeats of Russia, would be forced to 
conceded to Germany’s whims in Morocco and any other territories or face war. This was 
exactly the type of blackmail Crowe argued Germany used to get what they wanted.  
 
Section II: The Second Moroccan Crisis 
Even though they were not successful in using Morocco to get what they wanted the first time, 
the German leadership did not give up using Morocco for political advantage. Six years later in 
1911, Germany once again used Morocco to try to gain political leverage. Like the First 
Moroccan Crisis, diplomatically Germany had a leg to stand on. France had once again violated 
                                                 
121
 Ibid. 
 44 
an agreement. But it was the way in which Germany handled the problem that caused the event 
to become a major diplomatic incident that almost brought Europe to war.  
In 1909, France and Germany signed an agreement concerning Morocco. France agreed 
to safeguard economic equality in Morocco and would not hinder German economic and 
industrial interests there. Germany agreed to only pursue economic interests in Morocco and 
would not disturb French political interests there. Furthermore, Germany agreed not to encourage 
any economic privilege for themselves in Morocco.122 This gave France complete control over 
the policing of Morocco. 
 In April 1911, a rebellion broke out in Morocco against the Sultan, who was trapped in 
his house in the capital city of Fez. The French Ministry for Foreign Affairs sent troops in to put 
down the rebellion and occupy the capital. This act threatened the independence of Morocco 
under the Sultan as preserved by the Algeciras conference in 1906. The German government, 
arguing it was protecting German commercial interests in Morocco per the Franco-German 
agreement of 1909, dispatched the German gunboat Panther to the Moroccan port of Agadir in 
July.123 This set off shock waves in Europe.  
Even before the boat was sent, British leadership was anxious about German intentions 
concerning the French occupation of Fez. The British Ambassador in Vienna wrote to Grey in 
April stating the “German Chancellor has informed the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin that… 
should the French government occupy Fez and render position of Sultan one of absolute 
dependence upon France, basis upon which Treaty of Algeciras was founded would have 
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disappeared and that thereby whole of Moroccan question would be reopened.”124 Britain knew 
the French occupation of Fez would cause unrest in Germany. Crowe argued that Germany 
would try to repeat what the Germany had done with the First Moroccan Crisis. Crowe wrote in 
the minutes of that letter, “The situation is likely to become serious rapidly. Germany’s game is 
to repeat what she tried to do before and at the Algeciras conference: Frighten France by 
threatening armed intervention; urge England to abandon France…”125 All Crowe and the British 
Foreign Office could do was to sit in wait to see exactly what Germany did. A note was sent to 
the French Government warning them of Germany’s possible interference at the urging of 
Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Arthur Nicolson, who agreed with Crowe’s opinion of the 
situation.126 
On July 1, the Panther appeared on the coast of Morocco, the British Foreign Office was 
informed the next day. The Count de Salis, who was the counselor of the British embassy in 
Berlin at the time, wrote to Foreign Secretary Grey stating that according to the German 
Secretary of State “Public opinion [in Germany], which would not allow German Government to 
stand by while other Powers were dividing up country.”127  The German Secretary of State, 
Alfred von Kiderlen-Waechter, was justifying sending the Panther to Agadir by claiming public 
opinion would not allow the German government to sit by idly.  Furthermore, the German 
official stated that the Panther would stay in Agadir until Germany decided what to do.  Crowe 
saw this to be a serious problem as “It was hardly conceivable that Germany would have taken 
this step without considering the possible contingency of her policy leading to a war in which 
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France and England would be ranged against her… The fact that Germany has made the plunge, 
must give rise to the supposition that she now considers herself in a position to face the danger of 
an armed Franco-British opposition to her.”128 Crowe realized that Germany must have weighed 
the option of war and decided that Germany could successfully wage war against the British and 
French.  Furthermore, the British government firmly believed that Germany was out to disrupt 
the Anglo-French entente and British leaders were determined to resist. 
While Germany had a claim to protecting it’s interests in Morocco, the German 
government’s objectives went further. Germany did not expect France to relinquish her 
protectorate in Morocco, but Germany wanted to be compensated it. Germany had its eyes set on 
the French Congo, as the German government was looking to create a German Mittelafrika. 
Franco-German negotiations over the Moroccan problem started in June. The German 
government was trying to extract a bilateral settlement from France and decided to demonstrate 
German military strength hoping to convince France to settle more quickly.129  Furthermore, 
prior to sending the Panther, Germany did not believe England would interfere in this Moroccan 
crisis. The new German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethman-Hollweg130, wrote “His Majesty’s 
impression is that France’s action in Morocco is much disliked in England.”131 The Kaiser was 
correct that France’s occupation of Fez was not universally loved in England, but the appearance 
of the Panther had convinced the British that Germany was the bigger threat.  
Very quickly the Second Moroccan Crisis had turned from a Franco-German dispute to 
an Anglo-German dispute. By July 12, the British Foreign Office was on high alert concerning 
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Germans intentions. Crowe led the charge against Germany writing “I have no doubt as to the 
correctness of the diagnosis made by M. Jules Cambon that the [German] Emperor thought he 
had ‘captured’ the sympathies of England to a sufficient extent to justify the belief that he could 
fall upon France alone and neglect any British feeling in the latter’s favor.”132 Crowe and the 
British Foreign Office knew that the German government was trying to force France to do what 
German leaders wanted and assumed the British would not aid the French. Furthermore, Crowe 
stated “Germany may now be counted upon to continue her well-tried policy of blackmailing. 
For the present France is the victim…Nothing will stop this process except firm resolve, and the 
strength, to refuse, and, if necessary, to fight over it. This is the real lesson, not only for France, 
but also for us.”133 Crowe was pushing Grey and the foreign office to back France. 
The British Foreign Office now began watching the situation even more carefully as war 
became an increasing possibility. Events were not helped by the Germans either. On July 18, 
news broke to the British that “parties from German ship at Agadir land increasing numbers up 
to 40 men and make expeditions into the country around, spreading agitating rumors among the 
tribes and apparently with the intention of provoking incidents as pretexts for establishing a 
permanent landing party….”134 The Kaiser and his advisors were not content to simply have a 
war ship in the Moroccan port. The Germans intended to stir up more trouble in Morocco to 
further their claims that France was incapable of keeping order there, which affected German 
economic interests. By landing a permanent party to secure order in Agadir, the Germans could 
claim that they could keep order in Morocco where the French could not. Also, troops on the 
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ground in Morocco would make the French even more nervous to settle the problem quickly, 
giving Germany a bigger chip at the bargaining table.   
The British Foreign Office was unnerved by this. Crowe wrote, “We begin to see light. 
Germany is playing for the highest stakes. If her demands are acceded to either on the Congo or 
Morocco…it will mean definitely the subjection of France… The defeat of France is a matter 
vital to this country.”135  Arthur Nicolson agreed with Crowe’s assessment stating “We have 
arrived at a critical moment…If Germany saw the slightest weakening on our part her pressure 
on France would become intolerable to that country who would have to fight or surrender. In the 
latter case German hegemony would be solidly established, with all its consequences immediate 
and prospective.”136 The foreign office was already extremely hostile towards Germany because 
of the Crowe memorandum coupled with the events surrounding the navy and the Baghdad 
railway negotiations. British leaders could no longer sit idly by. Sir Edward Grey wrote the 
Prime Minister suggesting Britain stand by France even if it meant war.137  
By August, the possibility of war was looming on the horizon. Sir Vincent Corbett, a 
British Official in Munich wrote to Grey stating “It seems to me to be ominous that both in 
France and Germany the eventuality of war is beginning to be spoken of as a contingency 
regrettable but possibly unavoidable.”138 Unlike 1905, the French were now prepared for war and 
could stand up to Germany. The British Ambassador in Paris writes, “Now however the French 
army was in a highly efficient state and the people had confidence in it and then men had 
confidence in their officers and in themselves.”139 France was confident that its army could 
withstand the Germans now with the aid of the British Navy. This was a clear difference from 
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the First Moroccan Crisis where France wanted to avoid war at all costs.  The British 
government alerted the navy and was considering plans of sending 160,000 troops to help the 
French if war indeed became inevitable.140  
Unlike the First Moroccan Crisis, during which threats of war were made to Germany 
with little or no backing from the British government, the Second Moroccan crisis pushed 
Europe to the brink of war. The British Foreign Office under Grey had seen the truth in Crowe’s 
1907 Memorandum over the last four years and knew that only by forcing Germany to back 
down would Britain be able to avert German hegemony in Europe.  The British government was 
willing to go to war, even over a conflict that did not directly involved British interests. This was 
a clear change from the First Moroccan Crisis during which Britain had made threats, but had 
never really intended to go to war. In contrast, the British Foreign Office was prepared to go to 
war over the Second Moroccan Crisis. Foreign office officials even sent notes to the Prime 
Minister suggesting such. The Prime Minister was willing to ready the army and navy so that 
they could be deployed if war did break out. 
Germany quickly realized that England and France were willing to go to war over 
Morocco and began to negotiate with France. Germany did not believe that its fledgling navy 
was strong enough at the time to beat the British and did not want to condemn its navy to 
annihilation. Exploiting the crisis for domestic gain, German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz pushed 
an increase for the German naval program through the Reichstag.141 By November, France and 
Germany had come to a settlement. France received Morocco as a full protectorate and Germany 
received small slices of the French Congo. 
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While Germany gained parts of the French Congo, it was in no way the size or shape of what the 
German government had wanted to receive by their actions in Morocco. The German 
government succeeded in further alienating Germany in Europe and proved to Britain that 
Germany could not be trusted. It was a lesson Germany did not learn. The hostility towards 
Germany over the Second Moroccan crisis caused Great Britain to cease all negotiations with 
Germany.  
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Chapter IV: 
The Building of the German Navy 
 
Many historians have explored the connection between the naval arms race and the growing 
Anglo-German antagonism prior to the First World War. The antagonism over naval supremacy 
has been noted as a key reason that Great Britain eventually joined France and Russia in the 
entente. Eyre Crowe’s interpretation on the German navy and its role in the growing Anglo-
German tension was that “it is not merely or even principally the question of naval armaments 
which is the cause of the existing estrangement. The building of the German fleet is but one of 
the symptoms of the disease. It is the political ambitions of the German government and the 
nation which are the source of the mischief.”142 Crowe argued that the increasing German navy 
was a by-product of the actual problems Great Britain was having with Germany; the navy was 
not the source of the tension between the two countries. 
  The source of the tension was the German government’s goal of hegemony of Europe. 
The navy was simply a tool Germany was using in the struggle for hegemony. Crowe stated that 
Germany’s foreign policy was built around demands, brute shows of force, and blackmail. The 
navy was no exception to this policy. The German government knew that the British government 
could not afford to lose naval supremacy. Therefore, the German government could exploit this 
weakness to further their foreign policy goals. The negotiations over the navies made the British 
Foreign Office more wary and ultimately hostile towards the Germany government for the 
reasons Crowe stated in his 1907 memorandum. Even Richard Cosgrove agrees that the German 
navy made the British hostile towards Germany. 
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Wilhem II, Tirpitz, and the Beginning of the Naval Arms Race 
1897 brought many changes in the German government. Kaiser Wilhelm II brought in new men 
to assist him in running the country. In the terms of the German navy, no man was more 
important than Alfred von Tirpitz, the newly appointed State Secretary of the Reichsmarineamt 
(German navy). Wilhelm had already become infatuated with the idea of strong powerful 
German navy, and Tirpitz was equal to the cause. Soon after taking the position of naval 
secretary, Tirpitz managed to convince the Reichstag to finance expanding the navy, something 
his predecessor had never managed to do. 143 Furthermore, Tirpitz saw the need for a strong 
German navy as he felt that Germany’s “most dangerous enemy at the present time is 
England…The situation against England demands battleships in as great a number as 
possible.”144 Tirpitz felt that an Anglo-German conflict was unavoidable in the long term and for 
Germany to win said conflict the German government would need a strong navy.145  
 In April of 1898, the first of Tirpitz’s naval bills passed through the Reichstag. It 
authorized the construction and maintenance of “19 battleships, 8 armoured cruisers, 12 large 
cruisers and 30 light cruisers” to be constructed by April of 1904.146 This would bring 
Germany’s navy up to the status of Russia or France, but no where close to the size of the British 
Navy. This did not bother Wilhelm, Tirpitz or State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von 
Bülow, as they anticipated a future war between England and Russia over the near-east that 
would greatly weaken the British Empire. This event would allow Germany “to come to the 
center of the world’s stage” both through economic strength and the navy. 147  
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In spring of 1900 with Britain tied up fighting in South Africa, Tirpitz pushed through a 
second naval bill practically doubling the size of the German “fleet to 38 battleships, 20 
armoured cruisers, and 38 light cruisers.” 148 The bill did not come without complications in 
Germany. The Reichstag was originally unwilling to pass the bill as they did not have the 
funding and could not increase taxes without negotiating with individual German states. The 
Kaiser vowed to dissolve the Reichstag if they did not accept the second naval bill, which would 
have “produce[d] a return to the constitutional crises” that had been avoided in the mid-1890s. 
Ultimately, the bill was passed and financed with massive loans.149 The Boer War provided 
Germany the opportunity to increase the size of the fleet under the pretense of assisting the 
British. But Chancellor Bülow was careful to make sure that this did not arouse British 
suspicions as the German navy was still weak and in its infancy and  not ready for war with 
Britain. 150 
By 1902, Britain had become wary of the growing German challenge. Intense 
Anglophobia had run rampant in the German press during the Boer war and it caused King 
Edward VII of Britain to be hostile towards Germany in general. He found his nephew, Kaiser 
Wilhelm, to be pushy and tactless and nearly canceled a visit of the Prince of Wales to Berlin 
after being outraged by a speech by Bülow. In retaliation Wilhelm threatened to recall all 
ambassadors until the British Foreign Secretary, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice- the Marques of 
Lansdowne, intervened and smoothed over the situation.151 The British press also picked up on 
the hostility and was heavily anti-German. The majority of the British press “firmly believed that 
German hatred of Britain was irreversible and that the German fleet was aimed at wrestling 
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maritime supremacy from the Royal Navy: all efforts by the government  to hold out the olive 
branch to Berlin were therefore regarded with deep mistrust and heavily criticised.”152 
 In 1904 a war scare broke out between Germany and England due to Britain’s entente 
with France. The entente between Britain, France and possibly Russia ran counter to the 
fundamental German assumption that colonial quarrels would keep the three countries separate 
leaving Germany the ability to play them off each other.  With the entente finalized and Italy 
defecting from the Triple Alliance, Germany was humiliated. In a meager attempt to rescue 
themselves from the position, Germany approached Britain for compensation over changes in the 
administration of Egypt. The German government felt that Britain was snubbing them while they 
bought off other countries. Germany then hinted that if Britain did not acquiesce to German 
demands they would turn to Russia further angering the British Foreign Office.153 Russia was in 
the middle of the Russo-Japanese war and Germany hoped the war would distract Britain from 
Germany’s growing presence in the North Sea. During the beginning of the war it was likely that 
Britain would enter on the side of her ally, Japan.  But the war was not as big of a distraction as 
Germany hoped. The British admiralty was concerned that if the Russian navy emerged from the 
war visibly weakened, the German navy would be much stronger; thus bringing it into direct 
contention with the British Navy. 154 The German government, however, did not feel it was ready 
for a war with England. The government was concerned that “the possibility of war with England, 
in which the attack would come from England” was imminent as the sheer force of the British 
navy was substantially larger than the still-in-construction German fleet.155 
                                                 
152
 Ibid. 
153
 Ibid.,266-269. 
154
 Ibid., 269-270. 
155
 Ibid. 273 
 55 
 The 1904 war scare subsided, but by 1905 a new war scare broke out over the First 
Moroccan Crisis. The Kaiser’s declarations in Tangiers sent off shock waves in Europe, but the 
fact that he was on a German naval ship suggested that the whole force of the German navy was 
behind him. The First Moroccan crisis increased the growing antagonism between the British and 
German navies since it caused hostility and suspicion on both sides. Furthermore, Kaiser 
Wilhelm stated that he had “no desire for good relationship with England at the price of the 
development of Germany’s navy. If England will hold out her hand in friendship only on 
condition that we [Germany] limit our Navy, it is boundless impertinence and a gross insult to 
the German people.”156 
 
Suspicion and Ambitions 
From the moment Eyre Crowe took office in 1906, as Senior Clerk in the Western Department, 
he had a deep mistrust of Germany and their naval ambitions. Germany claimed many economic 
and defensive reasons for needing a navy. The British Ambassador in Bavaria wrote to Edward 
Grey stating, “that in the minds of the great mass of the [German] population [the navy] is not 
intended primarily for the purpose of aggression against England.”157 Crowe disagreed stating 
“the argument…that the Germany navy is not meant for anything else than the defense of 
Germany’s coasts and commerce is a rather hollow one.”158 He argued that the size and breadth 
of the German navy suggested that it was not for commerce and coastline defense alone. He 
claimed size of the German Navy was dictated by the size of the British Navy. Furthermore, he 
wrote “information in possession of this [British Foreign] office shows undisputably that the 
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whole German navy is inspired by the conviction that the object of its existence is ultimately to 
fight England.”159 Crowe was convinced that the German government wanted a strong navy for 
one purpose and one purpose alone: to use it to win a war against Britain. This coupled with 
Crowe’s memorandum made the British Foreign Office apprehensive of the German navy and 
unreceptive to any German negotiations over the fleet. 
 In December 1906, Britain unveiled a new ship named Dreadnought. The ship had only 
taken 14 months to build and was the first major warship propelled by turbines. The 
Dreadnought’s greatest innovation was its armaments. It had “ten 30.5 cm and twenty-two 7.6 
cm guns” and the “Dreadnought’s arrangement of five twin turrets (one fore, two aft, two side) 
gave her the firing-power equivalent of two pre-Dreadnoughts in broadside firing and three in 
firing ahead.”160 This gave the British Navy a superior advantage and some had claimed it was 
built specifically to deter German naval ambitions. Britain already had one of the new ships 
completed and they had done it in a quick time frame. 161 It would take Germany some time to 
make-up the ship building ground they had just lost 
 Britain waited to see what Germany would do in regards to the new ship. By the fall of 
1907 reports were circulating in Britain about a new German naval bill to be pushed through the 
Reichstag. The British Naval Attaché to the embassy in Bavaria, Philip Dumas, wrote in a report 
detailing the German Navy for 1907 that “the introduction of the Dreadnought type” forced 
Germany to “delay their building programme by something like a year...”162 The new ships did 
not deter Germany from building a strong navy. It simply forced them to restructure German 
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shipbuilding. In fact Germany presented a new bill in 1908 which proposed a 37 million pounds 
increase to the German debt over a ten year period so that it could increase the size of the 
German Fleet.163 The German government had accepted Britain’s inadvertent challenge and was 
willing to put Germany in considerable debt in the attempt to gain mastery of the sea. 
Furthermore, Dumas noted “that a considerable party in Germany are in the greatest 
hopes that by persistent efforts in the increase of their fleet the people of England will tire of the 
struggle for mastery of the sea and finally leave them in possession.”164 Germany felt that if they 
continued in the constant path of naval supremacy, England would ultimately grow tired of 
trying to compete with Germany. Crowe argued that part of this hope was because of the 
demonstration of British pacifists who “clamour for economics and reductions in naval and 
military expenditure…”165 These pacifists had recently been making demonstrations for 
disarmament in England which was garnering attention from the British press.  In addition, 
Crowe stated “every indication derived from what is being done and advocated in Germany, does 
now tend to confirm that the whole energy of her government is directed towards preparing foe 
the coming struggle with England.”166 
Moreover, Crowe stated that “The greater our efforts in the direction of disarmament, the 
more persistent will be Germany’s endeavour to overtake us.”167 Crowe was convinced that 
Germany wanted dominance of the seas so that they could win a war against Great Britain, and 
that they were willing to go to any lengths in the hopes that England would economically or 
mentally tire of the race. Germany, to Crowe, was going to win the naval battle no matter what 
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the costs, because hegemony of Europe depended on Germany being able to overtake the British 
navy. Crowe was determined that Great Britain could not allow them that chance. The German 
Ambassador in London, Count Metternich, tried to make it clear in a letter to Chancellor Bülow 
that England would defend its naval supremacy at all costs. He wrote “the German naval 
programme has awakened the vigilance of the British in the highest degree, and that England 
intends to maintain her supremacy at sea without question.”168 
  The construction of new German dreadnoughts and the increasing size of the German 
navy made the British even more convinced that war was likely to come with Germany. The 
questions were only how and when that war would come. The belief was generally held during 
this time, that before the hostilities were to break out that there would be some kind of general 
warning at least three days to three months prior. Colonel Trench at the British embassy in Berlin 
disagreed. Trench claimed that when Germany thought her navy had a reasonable chance of 
winning against the British fleet, that Germany would make the first strike without any warning. 
Crowe was quick to agree with Trench’s assessment that a German surprise attack was likely. 169 
 
Attempting to Reach an Accord 
In the fall 1908, the Britain and Germany governments made an attempt to come to some sort of 
naval understanding. The British Foreign Office, being pushed by King Edward VII, made a 
considerable effort to obtain a joint agreement with Germany to limit naval armaments. The 
German government was open to the idea, but Kaiser Wilhelm was not. The German 
Ambassador in London, Count Paul von Metternich, recounted a meeting he had with Foreign 
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Secretary Grey and Lord George in a letter to Chancellor Bülow; the letter is peppered with notes 
from the Kaiser criticizing Britain. Metternich wrote that both Ministers agreed that 
“Expenditure on the British navy had risen as a result of the German programme, and in 
proportion to the increased speed of construction…”170 In the marginal notes Wilhelm wrote 
“False! as a result of British greed for Power and their seeing bogies.”171 Wilhelm was convinced 
that his uncle and the British government were out to cripple Germany. British leaders were 
hoping to curtail the size of the German navy, as the British government was suspicious of 
German intent with the navy. The Kaiser refused to discuss the idea of any naval agreement with 
Britain. Wilhelm stated “We must not talk of that at all! We will never submit to dictation as to 
how our armaments are to be arranged.”172 Chancellor Bülow eventually agreed arguing “Not till 
there was less tension between Germany and England was it worth while discussing the question 
or perhaps possible to decide whether the two countries could agree about their ship-building, 
thus doing away with their fears of each other.”173  
In spring of 1909, Bülow and the German government tried once more to come to a 
diplomatic agreement with Britain. The Kaiser had become much more disposed to proposals for 
a naval agreement as well. Britain, however, had become more suspicious of Germany’s 
intentions. The new agreement Germany had sent to Britain was highly skewed in their favor and 
would significantly limit Britain’s ability to keep Germany in check. The agreement allowed 
Germany to continue expanding the size of its navy and forced Britain into a state of “benevolent 
neutrality,” in the case that Germany went to war with a neighboring country. Crowe argued 
“The German government’s desire for an “understanding” with England is of old standing…The 
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end and object of German foreign policy is to frustrate any combination between other Great 
Powers in which Germany is not the predominant partner.”174 Crowe believed that Germany 
wanted an agreement with Britain as a way to drive a wedge between the British-French entente. 
Germany did not want Britain or France to be in any alliance, either with each other or with 
another great power because the combined might of those two countries would put Germany at a 
disadvantage.   
Furthermore, British naval supremacy was the only thing keeping Germany from 
controlling the European continent. The new British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, 
agreed stating “The naval supremacy of Great Britain is…the only obstacle to the German 
domination of Europe, and it is evident that an arrangement which would remove that obstacle 
would be extremely acceptable to the Imperial Government.”175 The newly proposed agreement 
by Germany would do just that. It would allow Germany to continue to expand its navy while 
limiting the chances they would have to go up against the British navy. Edward Grey also saw 
the German proposal as a bad idea arguing the proposals are “an invitation to help Germany to 
make a European combination which could be directed against us when it suited her so to us 
it.”176  The proposals were summarily dismissed. 
In June 1909, Chancellor Bülow resigned having lost popularity with the Reichstag and 
having failed to gain support for more funding of the navy. He was replaced with the State 
Secretary of the Interior, Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg. Bethmann-Hollweg, like his predecessor, 
wanted a détente with England. He, however, came into conflict with Admiral Tirpitz who was 
unwilling to curtail the construction of the German navy.  In the fall of 1910, Britain sent its own 
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proposals for an Anglo-German naval agreement. While both the Liberal government in London 
and the imperial government in Berlin favored an agreement, the underlying suspicion and 
hostility caused the proposals to fall flat. Bethmann-Hollweg claimed that attitude of the British 
was causing the rift between the two countries. He wrote “this policy is above all responsible for 
the anxiety… regarding Germany’s naval policy. The indifference with which England regards 
the rise of the American navy is a proof that a strong fleet in the hands of a friendly power is not 
necessarily a subject of anxiety for England.”177 Bethmann-Hollweg argued that if Germany 
were a friendly power, as the British government was claiming, why then was there growing 
tension between Britain and Germany over the size of the Germany navy. There was no tension 
between Great Britain and the United States even though the American navy was expanding at a 
similar rate to Germany’s navy. Therefore, Bethmann-Hollweg argued Great Britain must see 
Germany as an antagonist and that attitude is causing the rift between the two countries.  
 When Germany countered the new British proposals with ones of their own, the British 
government became even more suspicious of German motivations. Crowe argued “the German 
gov[ernmen]t have merely held out the bait of their possibly consenting to such agreement [a 
limitation of naval armaments], for the purpose of getting their political agreement…They are 
none of them to be believed on their word.”178 Crowe felt the German government was playing a 
game with Britain to both divide Britain from the entente, and to come to an agreement to curb 
naval spending that would allow Germany’s navy to become as large as the British navy. British 
Ambassador Goschen agreed stating Germany “want[s] the Hegemony of Europe and to 
neutralize the only thing which has prevented them from getting it, viz., England’s naval 
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strength.”179 Goschen then produces a balance sheet with the net gains and losses from the 
current proposed agreements and notes that Germany gains significantly from the new proposals. 
He stated “the balance would be so heavy on the German side that I cannot see how it would 
remove ‘that atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion which has so long hung over the two 
countries.’”180 British officials in the foreign office were unreceptive towards any understanding 
over the British and Germany navies. The foreign office was suspicious of Germany’s 
motivations in regards to hegemony in Europe, which Great Britain could not allow. 
 By 1911 any chance of a naval arms agreement between Great Britain and Germany was 
gone. The Second Moroccan crisis broke out and the dispatching of the German gunboat Panther 
to the port of Agadir in July destroyed any lasting shreds of trust the British government had for 
German intentions.181 The Second Moroccan crisis proved to Britain that the intention of 
Germany in securing a naval agreement with England was “to allow Germany to deal with the 
other Powers, such as France and Russia, without any fear of British intervention.”182 In the 
proposed agreements by Germany in regards to the British navy, one of the key pieces had been 
that Britain and Germany would agree to “benevolent neutrality,” in the case that either went to 
war with a neighboring country. The Agadir crisis proved what the British Foreign Office had 
suspected all along: Germany was trying to force Britain to the sidelines while Germany took 
control of Europe by force. With the British army at bay, the combined force of the German 
army and navy could blackmail a weakened France and Russia into giving up control of 
whatever Germany wanted. Crowe stated “The German government now at last confess what we 
suspected from the outset to be the case…it is clear they never did believe that they could put 
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forward such proposals.”183 Germany had never had any intention of reducing their naval 
armaments according to Crowe; it was a ruse to get Great Britain to agree to a political 
agreement first with the intention of backing out when the naval agreements were to come up 
afterwards.  
 Furthermore, Crowe declared that “Now again, as on former occasions, the German 
gov[ernmen]t after a period of much unfriendliness on their part, come to woo us with assurances 
that if we will only do what they wish, it will lead to peace, the end of all friction and the definite 
establishment of Anglo-German friendship.”184 This was Germany’s modus operandi according 
to Crowe. The German government encourages Britain to do something with the promise of 
peace. It was a form of blackmail with peace being the prize. Sir Arthur Nicolson agreed with 
Crowe stating, “Sir Eyre Crowe’s minute is an admirable summary of what has passed…We 
have hitherto resisted, and rightly resisted, going further with Germany as regards to an 
understanding than we have done with France and Russia. I trust that we shall firmly maintain 
this attitude.”185 Nicolson was affirming Crowe’s belief and stressing to the British Foreign 
Office that the only way to deal with Germany was to resist their traps at all costs. Even Edward 
Grey reluctantly agreed stating “It would be well to have the papers put together, which… will 
bring out the points of Sir Eyre Crowe’s minute.”186 Grey saw the wisdom and logic in Crowe’s 
arguments against Germany, although it was much harder to convince the British government of 
that. Grey states further that the Second Moroccan crisis as well as Crowe’s opinions and 
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Ambassador Goschen’s letter “makes it easier for us to avoid being entangled in separate 
political negotiations with Germany to which other Powers are not parties.”187 
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Chapter V: 
Baghdad Railway and the Young Turk Revolution 
 
Much like the naval agreements, the Baghdad Railway and the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 
caused increased hostility between Great Britain and Germany. Similarly, they were symptoms 
of the problems between the British and German governments, not the cause of the growing 
antagonism. Unlike the naval agreements, historians have mostly overlooked the railway and the 
revolution as a significant event leading up to World War I. But the diplomatic negotiation and 
tensions between Great Britain and Germany regarding the railroad and the revolution feed into 
the deeper problems the two countries were facing. Historian Frederic C. Howe concurs stating 
“The Baghdad Railway incident figures more prominently in the Present European War [WWI] 
than is generally admitted.”188  It was in Britain’s best interest to come to terms with Germany 
over the railway, instead they thwarted the Baghdad railway at every turn. The hostile and 
suspicious postures of the two governments continued taking them on a collision course to war 
and every disagreement brought all of Europe closer to war. 
 Crowe did not have a large role in the Baghdad railway negotiations, as the negotiations 
fell under a different department within the foreign office.  The Baghdad railway, however, 
shows how hostile the British government was towards Germany because of Crowe’s 
memorandum. The foreign office thwarted German advances on the railway at every turn, while 
claiming the German government was being obstinate in negotiations. Furthermore, Crowe was 
“opposed [to] all plans for an agreement on the Baghdad railway or the Persian railway 
concessions.”189 
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The Beginnings of the Railroad 
Germany was a late entry to the race for colonies. Former Chancellor Otto von Bismarck 
had advised Kaiser Wilhelm I to leave the Near East alone as Germany had no real interests there.  
When Wilhelm II took the throne and relieved Bismarck of the Chancellorship, Germany’s 
policy in the Near East changed significantly. Wilhelm II was adamant about finding Germany’s 
“place in the sun” and he felt the only way to do that was if Germany was able to compete with 
the other Great Powers on their terms. This meant increasing the size of the German navy, but 
more importantly it meant that Germany needed spheres of influence in Europe and colonies 
abroad. 
 Towards the end of the nineteenth century Turkey was a crumbling nation. It was being 
called the “sick man of Europe” by the Great Powers and efforts were being made to slowly 
dismantle the Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s ailing status lead to significant economic and financial 
exploitation of Turkey through the “control of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration,” which 
was almost entirely made up of foreigners.191 In 1888, the German Deutsche Bank bought the 
right to an existing piece of railroad in Turkey (Figure 1) and to build and operate a new stretch 
of railway from Ismid (Izmit) to Angora (Ankara). The Bank set up the Anatolian Railroad 
Company to produce and operate the track. This marked the entry of German capital and 
interests in Turkey and would lay the foundation for the eventual Baghdad railway.192 
 The speed and thoroughness at which the Germans worked on the project won over 
support for them in Constantinople with many of the interest groups that had originally been 
suspicious of German motivations. In two years the new stretch of railway had almost been 
completed and the Turkish Sultan was hoping to extend the railway to the Persian Gulf. The 
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French were clamoring to get the contract for the stretch of railroad from Angora to Baghdad, 
but impressed with the German’s work the Sultan encouraged the German investors to 
continue.193 
 The German investors were hesitant in agreeing as there had not been a preliminary study 
detailing the technical difficulties of the route or the cost-benefit of doing so. The Sultan 
recognized the concerns as valid and not only agreed that the Germans should wait for the study 
but volunteered to finance it. A few days later the Sultan had his ambassador in Berlin requested 
support for the Angora-Baghdad line from the Kaiser.194 When the study was completed it was 
determined that both the terrain and route would be rather difficult to build on and the chance of 
the monetary gain was small. The Deutsche Bank was hesitant to agree to the project, especially 
as German finances were feeling the strain of a world banking crisis of the early 1890s. The 
German Foreign Office, however, felt differently. The German government could not give up the 
growing prestige and influence it was gaining in Turkey. The German government feared if they 
turned down the Baghdad section of the railway it would surely go to France and influence 
would go with it. Furthermore, when the Turks had gone to the Germans about extending the line 
to Baghdad, the French, British, and Belgians all began scrambling to get the railways contract 
and the prestige and privileges that went with it. The German government had to use every tool it 
had in Turkish diplomacy or it would lose its claim. The German government came up with an 
alternate solution for problems with the terrain and financing and was finally granted the 
extension of the line in 1893.195 
The course of events, however, caused friction between England and Germany. The 
proposed changes to the railway from Angora to Baghdad cut through an area where two British 
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railroads already operate. The area was already considered British territory for expansion and the 
newly proposed German lines would curtail the British railways. The British were indignant at 
the idea and they sent their ambassador to the Sultan demanding that he reconsider and hinting 
that if the British demands “were not respected there might be a naval demonstration to give it 
more force.”196 This caused outrage in Berlin and the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
complained to the British ambassador that England was making the railroad a matter of political 
status rather than an economic competition. Moreover, as the railroad was a special project to the 
Kaiser, the British proceedings were a personal insult to him.  The British ultimately backed 
down after the Sultan granted a concession to the Anatolian Railroad Company to build two 
other lines. This gave Germany the dominant position in terms of railroad development in 
Turkey.  The first of these two additional lines, from Eskisehr to Konia (Konya), was completed 
in 1896. Due to the world market and the political difficulties in Turkey, however, Germany 
waited to continue the line to Baghdad.197   
By the end of 1898 the Deutsche Bank wanted to continue the line but was having 
difficulties with funding. The bank also realized there would be serious political complications in 
completing the line to Baghdad. The new line would be the quickest route to India, and the 
British were likely to pose serious problems if they had no stake in the railroad. Furthermore, the 
French and Russians were likely to have serious qualms as well.  The German bank approached 
the British and French bankers about possible agreements. The British turned them down based 
on prior experience, but the French were willing to compromise. The French banks agreed to 
help fund the railroad as long as they got equal percentage in stock of the railway with Germany. 
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Then in November of 1899, Deutsche Bank went to the Sultan to ask for a concession to 
extend the Konia line to Baghdad rather than the Angora line, because it would be easier to 
construction and less likely to upset the Russians. The Russian’s, however, voiced objections to 
the project. The Russian government demanded exclusive rights to build railroads on the Black 
Sea basin and would only agree to drop the demand if Turkey would revoke the German 
allowance to build a railway. After much negotiation, Turkey finally agreed to give Russia 
exclusive rights to the Black Sea basin but managed to insert a clause that allowed the Ottoman 
government to build in that region without foreign capital.198 
The only possible problem left was Great Britain. Initially the British Foreign Office told 
Germany that it was not unfriendly to the railroad but that it was up to British banks and industry 
if they wanted to aid in the project. But nine months later, in 1902, as final negotiations were 
going with the French and German; the British had yet to join the project. Finally the Director of 
the Deutsche Bank managed to find two officials to make a proposition to the British Foreign 
office to join the building of the railroad.199  British public opinion was against the cause, 
however. The British press claimed the Baghdad railway was just a “scheme to dupe English 
capital and entangle England with Russia. The benefits of the scheme would surely go to 
Germany, while England would pay the bill by loss in prestige…”200 In addition, if the Baghdad 
railway extended to Basra it would have destroyed British trade between India and the Suez 
Canal.201 Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary for Foreign affairs at the time, argued it would be better 
for England to be involved with the project since then Britain would have proper share of control 
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over the railway.  Under the pressure from public opinion, the British government ultimately 
backed out of negotiations.202  
Furthermore, the British withdrawal led to increased pressure on the French to back out 
of the railway as well. The Russians were pressuring their alliance partners to back out of the 
deal with Germany. Although the French Ambassador argued that French interests in Turkey 
were much different from Russian interests and the alliance “does not compel us to abandon 
them [French interests].”203 Eventually, the French government backed out of the Baghdad 
railway arguing the financial agreement was unfavorable to the French, although the French 
financers protested the move. The German government was adamant that the Russian’s had 
forced the French to back out. So Germany was indignant when the Russian government once 
again asked Turkey for compensation for the Baghdad railway. The Russian government did not 
push the issue and Germany began building the railroad without international cooperation.204 
 
 
Anglo-German Hostility over the Railroad 
In 1903, the German government along with the Deutsche Bank pushed forward on the railroads 
without the cooperation of Britain, France, or Russia. But Germany soon ran into problems with 
funding, and the only way to continue building the railroad was to get monetary aid from other 
sources. The German government quickly learned that any solution to the problem with the 
Baghdad railway was going to have to involve an international political solution. Germany 
managed to free up some of the money by a tariff reform in Turkey and by negotiating with 
French financers.  
                                                 
202
 Wolf, The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad, 43-45. 
203
 Ibid. 
204
 Ibid., 45-47. 
 72 
In 1907 demand for stock in the railway suggested to the Germans that some foreign 
power was trying to buy controlling interest in the company. Germany, already highly suspicious 
of England, pointed the finger at British banker Sir Ernest Cassell. Germany devised a plan to 
assure control over the railway by asking the Sultan for concession to irrigate the Konia region 
which would allow the railway company to double its stock. The British ambassador in Turkey 
protested but the railroad company was given the rights in 1907. It was at this point where the 
political negotiations and hostility between Great Britain and Germany over the railway became 
evident. Once again British and German suspicion of each other’s motives made it clear that war 
between them was a looming possibility. 
The Germans had already gone out on a limb twice in the attempt to get the British 
involved with the railway and twice the British government had turned them down. The 
Anatolian railway company had British, as well as French, financers but there was no 
government agreement with Germany over control or stock of the railway. At the tail end of 
1907, Sir Edward Grey wrote a memorandum, included are discussions of the Baghdad Railway 
where the current Foreign Secretary did not recognize his predecessor’s failures with the railway. 
Grey wrote the British government “feel[s], however, that if other nations are to take part in the 
enterprise the German Gov[ernmen]t should make proposals to other Powers with whom she 
wishes to cooperate including ourselves.”205 Furthermore, Grey stated “Great Britain holds a 
preponderant position in the Persian Gulf… and for these reasons H[is] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] 
could not welcome a Railway to the Persian Gulf if they were excluded from a fair share in its 
permanent control.”206 Grey knew that Britain’s position in India was a chief priority and the 
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Baghdad railway could be used to threaten it.  If Britain could not get some control over the line, 
Germany and the railway could cause serious problems. The fear of German intervention in India 
was more hypothetical than based on fact. The Kaiser had no intention of sending troops to India 
if war with England broke out.207   
Deep-seated hostility towards Germany because of Crowe’s memorandum and the First 
Moroccan Crisis led Grey to believe that the German government should come to Britain if 
Germany wanted British help with the railway. Grey ignores the fact that the German 
government had twice previously attempted to do so. Furthermore, the state of relations between 
Great Britain and Germany due to the First Moroccan Crisis and the naval tensions made it 
unlikely that German was going to reach out to England at the time.   
In summer of 1908, the question of the Baghdad railways came up in a meeting between 
the Kaiser and King Edward. Grey and the Foreign Office had instructed the king that Britain 
could not discuss the question of the Railway alone with Germany, but that France and Russia 
must be involved. The British Foreign Office could not afford to let Germany use the Baghdad 
Railroad to drive a wedge in the entente between England and France. Germany had already 
attempted to do so through other various means, and the British were suspicious they would try 
to do so again. The Kaiser originally agreed to a four powers conference to discuss the 
railway.208 Nevertheless, when the Kaiser returned home, the German government would not 
allow discussion of a four power conference about the railway. The German Government had 
tried once already to get Britain, France and Russia to assist in the Railway with no success. 
Furthermore, the German government believed that the conference would be a complete failure 
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and only cause more friction between the four countries. The German government feared that 
Germany would be in the minority against the three other powers.209  
Just as the discussions between Britain and Germany about the Baghdad railway ended, 
revolution occurred in Turkey. The Young Turks were a group of reformers, modernist, and 
liberal-minded thinkers in Turkey that formed a coalition opposing the government. In July of 
1908, part of the Turkish army revolted. The Sultan tried to suppress the movement, but it 
backfired and rebellion broke out. The revolution eventually subsided with the ousting of the 
current Sultan in favor of a new Sultan, Mehmed. It also brought a parliamentary government to 
Turkey. The revolution caused considerable problems for Germany. The Young Turks felt the 
German government had propped up the government of the former sultan and helped suppress 
their cause. Furthermore, they felt the Kaiser was an autocrat that was stifling democratic reform 
in Germany.  To make matters worse, Germany’s closest ally, Austria caused further problems 
when Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina while the revolution was going on. All of this caused 
Germany’s prestige in Istanbul to drop considerably and continuing the railroad was highly 
unlikely.210  
The new government in Turkey was decidedly pro-British since the Young Turks 
believed England was the bastion of democracy in Europe. The British had hoped that the new 
government “would solve the problem of the Baghdad railway for them” and prevent the 
Germans from completing the railway.211 Initially, the new Turkish government wanted to do 
just that by repealing the German company’s contract for the railway. The government, however, 
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decided it would look bad if it did remain “true to the obligations of its predecessor…”212 The  
Turkish government did turn to Britain for other things. In 1909, the Ottoman navy was put 
under the command and training of a British admiral, and the British were given considerable 
power over the Turkish ships and naval yards.213 
Germany knew, with the new government in Turkey, it was going to be complicated to 
complete the Baghdad Railway without getting British support in the future. The British were 
trying to gain concessions from Turkey to build their own railway lines, but the Turkish 
government was uneasy to grant them as they had already given the area to Germany. The 
German Foreign Minister in Turkey suggested that the best thing would be to allow the British 
“to participate in the Persian Gulf-Baghdad section in equal shares with the Germans and 
eventually the French...”214 But the growing hostility over the naval arms race in 1908-1909 
made it unlikely that Germany and Great Britain would be able to work something out. 
Additionally, Britain was blocking the progress of the railway line in the hopes of convincing 
Turkey to lower British customs dues.215 
 Then in 1909, Grey went to the German Ambassador Metternich suggesting Britain 
would like to arrive at an understanding with Germany over the Railway. Metternich noted that 
Grey did not go into details about what the basis for the understanding would be. Metternich 
suggested to Grey that “an understanding about the Baghdad Railway should not be attempted 
unless preceded by a general political, plus a naval understanding."216 The German government 
knew that England could not step aside and let Germany build the Baghdad railway without 
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some control or assurance that it would not be used against England interests in India. Therefore, 
Bethmann-Hollweg was confident he could us it as a bargaining chip to get the Anglo-German 
agreement he wanted with England over the navy and the Entente.  
The two governments waited while British and German bankers attempted to come to 
some sort of agreement in relation to the commercial interests of the two countries in relation to 
the railway; as no political agreement could come until a commercial agreement had been made. 
217
 But by January of 1910, the British were concerned they had gotten themselves in over their 
heads with the Germans.  The negotiations between the Director of the Deutsche Bank, A. von 
Gwinner, and the British Financer Sir Ernest Cassell were hung up on kilometric guarantees and 
construction costs. Grey called it being “dragged into the vortex,” and he found it increasingly 
hard to defend the British governments actions either in Parliament or in the Press.218 
 Furthermore, naval negotiations, which had been on going since 1908, were once again 
breaking down between Germany and Great Britain, making it harder to come to an agreement 
about the railway. In February of 1910, Grey tried to reverse the process by attempting to make 
the Baghdad “railway question independent of the naval negotiations.”219 He hoped that an 
agreement over the railway could make it easier for naval and political agreements. But the 
railway negotiations were at an impasse; Britain wanted the Persian Gulf section of the railroad 
but was unwilling to give Germany adequate compensation for it. German leaders believed with 
German public opinion already being hostile towards England that they could not give up such 
an important section to British control without significant compensation.220 England, however, 
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felt that Germany was simply unwilling to grant them the Persian Gulf section of the line, even 
thought they had offered an “agreement in regard to Persia.”221  In addition, British officials were 
once again suspicious of Germany’s motives claiming “we must now abandon the idea of 
coming to terms with Germany over the Baghdad line, although their overtures will probably be 
renewed…”222 Crowe took an even harder stance. He argued the German government had no 
intention of giving Great Britain any rights to the Baghdad line, but that this was a clever ruse 
designed to “deliberately opened up the false prospect of an agreement respecting limitations of 
armaments, in order to entangle H[is] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] once more in the meshes of an 
Anglo-German agreement of the well-known type, under which it is the part of Great Britain to 
pay compensation to Germany.”223  
Crowe was arguing what he had argued many times before, that Germany was not trying 
to come to any real agreement with Great Britain. Germany was after an agreement that would 
drive Great Britain away from the Entente and keep England out of war between Germany and 
either France of Russia. The railway was just another means to an end to the same goal that 
Germany had been trying to achieve since 1904. Furthermore, Crowe argued “It is difficult to 
understand how Great Britain could entertain such a scheme…If H[is] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] 
were minded to abandon France to Germany, they would at least demand an enormous price. But 
to ask us for such abandonment of France, and make, in addition, onerous conditions about the 
Baghdad railway and Persia, is a plan to characterize with is really difficult to find the 
appropriate adjectives.”224 
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Negotiations continued into the summer and fall of 1910, but as the naval negotiations 
were more or less at a standstill so were negotiations over the railway. Britain’s deep hostility 
and mistrust of the Germans did not allow them to seriously consider any of the proposals 
Germany sent over. Germany, on the other hand, was seriously considering the proposals Britain 
sent over. Germany, however, felt it was in a position of power over Great Britain with the 
railway because it came so close to British interests in India. The German government was 
overconfident that they could use the railway as a bargaining tool to get major concessions from 
Great Britain in terms of naval agreements and to force a split in the triple entente. The two sides 
were unwilling to waver on their perspective platforms, making it obvious that neither side was 
really committed to coming to arrangement.  
As negotiations stalled over the Baghdad railway, Britain attempted to keep a hold of 
their interests in the Persian Gulf went to the Sultan to gain concessions to build a railway in the 
Tigris valley. This railroad would almost overlap the Baghdad railway and would be a direct 
competitor. The German government was not happy with Britain encroaching on what they 
believed to be rightfully theirs. Germany became increasingly hostile to the British arguing 
German “proposals had not only been rejected by His Majesty’s Government, but the latter had 
also tried to put obstacles in the way of the German project.”225 The German government 
believed that Britain was trying to hinder German progress in any way possible, whether with the 
German navy or the Baghdad railroad. The German Government was quick to note that the 
British had no hostility towards the Baghdad railway scheme the French were proposing. 226 
Britain, however, felt that they had done everything possible to come to an agreement 
with Germany. They had, more than three times, attempted to come to an agreement with 
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Germany only to be rebuffed at every turn and have exorbitant demands placed on Britain. The 
British government argued “It may be that the construction of the railway can be completed…but 
it is not for his Majesty’s Government actively to co-operate to this end at the expense of British 
commerce.”227 The British government was resigned that “Such then are the causes which have 
rendered all negotiation for British participation in the Baghdad railway ineffective…”228  
But it was Britain’s hostility towards Germany that had rendered the negotiations 
ineffective. The British government’s suspicion, whether it was founded or not, had not allowed 
the government to make any concessions on the railway. Britain was suspicious of Germany’s 
every move and was unwilling to accept that they were being unfair to Germany. Britain’s 
influence in India trumped every other country’s rights in the Middle East, and  Britain was 
hostile to any other countries influence in the area. The British government had been hostile to 
the Baghdad railway from the beginning and once the Young Turk revolution cemented British 
power in Turkey, all negotiations over the Baghdad railway were a farce. The British 
government did not want part of the railway as much as they wanted to make sure the railway 
didn’t happen so that it could not be used against British interests in India. Once Britain had 
power in Turkey, the primary goal of the British government was to impede the construction of 
the Baghdad railway.  
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Chapter VI: 
Hostility Boils Over  
 
From 1911 to June of 1914, Anglo-German relations were at an impasse. Neither side trusted the 
other enough for any real settlement to be found between them, even though negotiations over 
the navy and the Baghdad railway continued right up until July of 1914.  Eyre Crowe’s 
memorandum and the events afterwards had made the British leaders hostile to all things German. 
The Second Moroccan Crisis proved to Britain leaders that Germany could not be trusted. The 
British believed that German leaders were after one thing: European hegemony.  Additionally, 
the British government thought that German leaders would do anything in their power to pull 
Great Britain away from the Triple Entente.  For their part, the German government felt that 
Britain was trying to hinder German progress in any way possible. The increasing hostility 
between the two countries made it unlikely that anything would be settled between them. 
 But during the three years between the Second Moroccan Crisis and the outbreak of the 
First World War, Europe’s eyes shifted to the Balkans. In 1912, the First Balkan War broke out 
with the countries of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro declaring war on the declining 
Ottoman Empire.  The crisis was made worse by the possibility of Austria-Hungary and Russia 
joining into the war in the hopes of gaining territory and influence in the area. Germany and 
Great Britain were both hoping to keep the conflict localized to the Balkan region. The German 
government did not feel that October of 1912 was the correct time to get into a European war 
since Admiral Tirpitz did not believe the German navy could beat the British at sea. Furthermore, 
Germany’s strongest ally, Austria, would be distracted by the Balkan states and Turkey would be 
unable to assist Germany in a war against Russia.  With the threat of Austria-Hungary and 
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Russia joining the Balkan Crisis looming, Great Britain and Germany called for a conference in 
London to settle the matter. The Great Powers (Great Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Germany, 
and Russia) settled the question with the Treaty of London, and then enforced the terms on 
Turkey and the Balkan states.229 
 Germany and Great Britain’s peaceful cooperation in dealing with the First Balkan War 
suggested to both sides that some sort of agreement could be found between them on other 
matters. This restarted negotiations between the two about naval agreements, the Baghdad 
Railway and possible political agreements.  But the two countries quickly came to the same 
impasse they had found before the First Balkan War. Both countries were too suspicious and 
hostile towards the other for any real settlement to be found. Furthermore, public opinion in both 
countries made it unlikely any settlement would not cause the press to be outraged with the 
current government.  
 In June of 1913, Bulgaria declared war on its former allies Serbia and Greece since the 
Bulgarian government was unsatisfied with the terms imposed on them by the Treaty of London. 
Seeing the possibility for territorial gain, Romania and Turkey then joined the war on the side of 
Serbia and Greece. Unlike the First Balkan War, the Great Powers opted to refrain from 
involvement in the second war. Britain, France and Germany were concerned that intervention 
this time would cause further hostility between Austria-Hungary and Russia and ignite a general 
European war. Ultimately, Bulgaria called for an armistice as Romanian troops were circling the 
Bulgarian capital. Bulgaria ended up giving up much of its gains in the First Balkan wars to its 
former allies.230  
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 Nevertheless, by abstaining from the Second Balkan war so that a conflict between the 
Great Powers would not erupt, the Great Powers created an even bigger problem. Serbia had 
long resented Austria-Hungary for annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Young Turk 
Revolution in 1908. The Serbian government had idealistic notions of a “greater Serbia” that 
included the territory Austria-Hungary had annexed. Having now defeated Turkey, Serbians set 
their eyes on the Austrian territory they felt was rightfully theirs. Even members of the great 
powers “observed that the Treaty of Bucharest ‘cannot last. We are moving towards a new 
Balkan war.’”231 None of the Great Powers could have known that their non-intervention in the 
Second Balkan war would eventually cause the First World War to happen.  
 
The July Crisis 
On June 28th 1914, the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated 
in Sarajevo, Bosnia by a Serbian ultra-nationalist. Austria-Hungary was outraged and the 
Austrian government knew that if they did not punish Serbia, it would challenge the status and 
prestige of Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, Serbia had long been a menace to the Austrian 
government and this was Austria’s chance to eliminate Serbia as a political problem.232 The 
German government agreed with their Austrian allies arguing “The Serbian Government has 
created an atmosphere in which alone such explosions of blind fanaticism are possible.”233 The 
German Government resolved to stand behind their ally. Wilhelm II “pledged that Austria-
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Hungary could ‘in this case, as in all others, rely upon Germany’s full support” in dealing with 
Serbia.234 By doing so Germany caused an even bigger diplomatic struggle and ultimately war.  
 Diplomatically, Germany knew that the situation could get out of hand very quickly. 
While Austria-Hungary was still mulling over decisions about how to handle Serbia, Germany 
and Great Britain were discussing moderation.  The German ambassador told the British that 
Austria-Hungary “must have some compensation in the sense of some humiliation of Serbia.”235 
Historian P.H.S. Hatton argued Bethmann-Hollweg “assumed in July 1914 that Britain and 
France would permit Austria to absorb or at least humiliate Serbia. The Austrian Ambassador 
had asked Grey as far back as 14 November 1912 what action Britain would take if Austria 
attacked Serbia, and the fact that he received no answer might have encouraged an optimistic 
frame of mind.”236 
Furthermore, the German government felt it must support Austria-Hungary or be accused 
of not supporting Austria or in some way holding Austria back. According to Grey, the German 
government knew that “if she let events take their course there was the possibility of very serious 
trouble.”237 The German government was also worried that Russia could be a major problem and 
German leaders hoped the British government could influence the Russian government to be 
civil with Austria-Hungary over the Serbian problem. The British government agreed to mitigate 
the problems with Russia if they could.238 
 The largest problem that occurred was not a diplomatic struggle but waiting that occurred 
while Austria-Hungary came to a decision. Public outrage towards Serbia was at an all-time high 
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in the beginning of July right after the Archduke was assassinated. But the slow steady pace of 
the Austrian-Hungarian government wore down the support they had. On July 5, Wilhelm II 
pledge support for Austria in dealing with Serbia.  It was not until July 14 that the Hungarian 
government agreed with the Austrian government that war against Serbia was needed, but only 
after the Hungarian premier made it clear that Austria-Hungary was not looking to annex any 
Serbian territory.  Eventually the Austro-Hungarian governments agreed to send an ultimatum to 
Serbia with several demands. Some of the demands were so harsh it was unlikely Serbia would 
be able to consent to them and Serbian refusal would give Austria-Hungary the pretext to go to 
war. The ultimatum, however, was not sent to the Serbian government until July 23 and the 
Austro-Hungarian government wanted a response by July 25. 239 
 Part of the reason for Austria-Hungary’s delay in issuing the ultimatum was the 
organization of the Austrian military. The head of the military had instituted a policy of 
scheduled leaves for soldiers during the harvest to “appease the monarchy’s agrarian 
interests.”240 This allowed soldiers to leave for certain weeks to go home, help in farms and then 
return at the end of summer for maneuvers. During the July Crisis, sizable portions of the 
military were gone and if the Austrian government cancelled the leaves it would have altered 
Europe to looming military action. The Austrian leaders decided to continue the leaves as most 
of them would end by July 22. Hence, the government could not send any demands or threaten 
any action until the end of July.241 
 By the end of July, however, the popular support for the Austro-Hungarian government 
had all but fizzled away. The other Great Powers were now concerned that too much time had 
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elapsed and that Russia would back Serbia against Austria-Hungary making the situation even 
more difficult. The British ambassador in Italy, Rennell Rodd, wrote to Grey stating there was 
some uneasiness at the German embassy in Italy. Furthermore the German embassy “seem[ed] to 
anticipate that the Austro-Hungarian Government is about to address a very strong 
communication to [Serbia], and fear that [Serbia], having a very swelled head, and feeling 
confident of the support of Russia, will reply in a manner which Austria can only regard as 
provocative.”242 The Russian support for the Austrian government had diminished and the 
Russian government was now willing to back Serbia if the Russian government thought 
Austria’s demands were too high. Austria had calculated their next move for too long and now 
any demands were likely to imply that Austria was after more than just justice. The more likely 
Russia was to back Serbia with the possibility of war, the more likely it became that Germany 
would have to back Austria.243 
 The ultimatum and list of demands sent to Serbia on July 23 caused shock and outrage by 
the other Great Powers by the next day. The British Ambassador in Russia, Sir G. Buchanan 
wrote to Grey that Russia “had just received a text of ultimatum presented by Austria at Belgrade 
yesterday that demands a reply in forty-eight hours. Step thus taken by Austria meant war…”244 
In addition, the demands to Serbia were unreasonable according to Crowe. He wrote “If Austria 
demands absolute compliance with her ultimatums it can only mean she wants a war. For she 
knows perfectly well that some of the demands are such as no State can accept, as they are 
tantamount to accepting a protectorate.”245 
                                                 
242
 Sir Rennell Rodd,  no 74 Letter to Sir Edward Grey, July 20 1914 in British Documents: The Outbreak of War, 
60-61. 
243
 Ibid. 
244
 Sir G. Buchanan, no. 101 Letter to Sir Edward Grey, July 24 1914 in Ibid., 80. 
245
 Sir Eyre Crowe, minute note on no. 171 Communication by the Servian Minister, July 27 1914, in Ibid., 121. 
 86 
 Regardless of the Serbian reply, the response to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was that 
war was now likely.  Crowe stated “The moment has passed when it might have been possible to 
enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia.”246 The British knew the tide had turned 
and war was imminent. The only question that remained to be seen was if Britain would join the 
war. Grey agreed with Crowe stating “The points raised by Sir Eyre Crowe merit serious 
consideration, and doubtless the cabinet will review the situation.”247 But Grey was hesitant to 
join the war outright as there was a growing antiwar sentiment in England.  Grey stated “I do not 
consider that public opinion would or ought to sanction our going to war in the [Serbian] 
quarrel.”248 
Furthermore, the British, French and Russian governments already blamed Germany for a 
possible war.  According to Buchanan the Russian minister for Foreign affairs “characterized 
Austria’s conduct as immoral and provocative. Some of the demands which she had presented 
were absolutely unacceptable, and she would have never have acted as she had done without first 
having consulted Germany.”249 To the Russian foreign minister war could have been averted if 
Germany had not allowed Austria to provoke Serbia and Russia. Yet again, British Officials 
hostility towards Germany did not allow them to see events clearly.  Political Scientist Samuel 
Williamson Jr., argues the British Foreign Office failed to realize Austria’s desire for war. 
British leaders saw Austria “as an appendage of Berlin” and they “believed Berlin could control 
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Vienna.”250 But Austria was the third largest state in Europe with a proud monarchy and the 
Austrians “wanted a resounding defeat of the Serbians.”251  
Eyre Crowe placed even more blame on the German government arguing that “The point 
that matters is whether Germany is or is not absolutely determined to have this war now.”252 
Crowe felt that Germany was pushing Austria into this war because Germany thought British 
public opinion over the assassination would keep England out of the fight. Crowe felt that British 
“interests are tied up with those of France and Russia in this struggle, which is not for the 
possession of [Serbia], but one between Germany aiming at a political dictatorship in 
Europe…”253 To Crowe and many in the British Government, Germany was using the July Crisis 
as an excuse to launch a war on France or Russia or both as a way finally to gain control of 
Europe. The British leaders were suspicious of Germany’s intentions. Those suspicions couple 
with British hostility towards Germany made it even more likely that war was unavoidable in the 
long run. 
 In addition, conflicting messages from Germany made the British government all the 
more suspicious that Germany wanted a war. Originally a French newspaper reported that the 
German ambassador told the Foreign Ministry in France that the German government had 
“approved the contents and form of Austrian note to [Serbia]” and that the German government 
hoped it could be a localized affair.254  But the German ambassador protested stating that the 
German government had no prior knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum and was informed of its 
contents only after the note was delivered to Serbia. The distrustful British government was wary 
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that Germany was using the events to gain political ground as both England and Russia were 
occupied by internal labor strikes.255 With domestic problems in England and Russia, it would be 
the perfect time for German leaders to start a war. 
 The Serbian government collaborating with Russia drafted a reply to the Austro-
Hungarian government and presented it two minutes before the deadline expired. Serbian agreed 
to all but two demands, but Austria wanted nothing less than complete compliance with their 
ultimatum. Unknown to Austria, both Serbia and Russia had already begun partially mobilizing 
their armies in anticipation of Austria’s response. Austria-Hungary began mobilizing a few days 
later but no declarations of war were announced.256 
 British leadership knew that events were unfolding quickly. They still, however, believed 
that war could still be averted if they could get Germany to back down. The French Minister for 
Foreign Affairs as well as several members of the British Foreign Office believed that a show of 
solidarity by Great Britain, France and Russia would cause Germany to force Austria to back 
down. The Triple Entente felt it had to win Germany over to the cause of peace. But Sir G. 
Buchanan disagreed stating that if England tried to force Germany to back down Germany would 
“stiffen her attitude, and it was only approaching her [Germany] as a friend…could induce her to 
use her influence at Vienna to avert war.”257 To British leaders, war rested solely on the 
shoulders of the German government. 
 Yet again, Eyre Crowe saw events more clearly. To Crowe the question was not whether 
the British Government could force Germany to back down, but what would the world do when 
war broke out. Crowe stated that “the real difficulty to be overcome will be found in the question 
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of mobilization. Austria is already mobilizing…If Russia mobilizes, we have been warned 
Germany will do the same, and as German mobilization is directed almost entirely against 
France, the latter cannot possibly delay her own mobilization.”258 Crowe realized that 
mobilization was a chain reaction and that if Russia mobilized to defend Serbia, Germany would 
mobilize to defend Austria.  
The nature of German mobilization and attack plans suggested a two front war with 
France and Russia. To counter this, the German military had devised a plan where they would 
mobilize quickly and defeat the French army within 39 days. The German army would then 
move their forces to the east to fight Russia. The German military believed that Russian 
mobilization would take Russia longer than it would take Germany to defeat the French army. 
But the German military plan had the Germans going through Belgium to invade France from 
above, as opposed to fighting them on the Franco-German border. This meant that if Germany 
could not get a guarantee of French neutrality, war would be forced upon France. Crowe 
concluded “that within 24 hours His Majesty’s Government will be faced with the question 
whether, in a quarrel so imposed…on an unwilling France, Great Britain will stand idly aside, or 
take sides.”259  
 But it was not Austria that should be blamed for the possibility of war breaking out. The 
British Foreign Office believed the responsibility for war rested on Germany’s shoulders. 
Germany was playing a two-face game in the minds of the British Foreign office. Germany was 
preaching moderation to Britain while encouraging Austria to continue the path towards war. 
Great Britain even suggested putting together a conference of Great Britain, France, Italy and 
Germany to resolve the matter and that mobilization should be halted till the results of the 
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conference. Germany, however, “declined to entertain the idea” because it felt the conference 
would dictate terms to Austria-Hungary.260 Furthermore Sir Arthur Nicolson stated that he 
“cannot believe that Austria would have gone so far as she has done without having informed 
Germany… and secured her promise of co-operation.”261 This went in the face of the assurance 
Germany had been making to Great Britain about preaching moderation to Austria.  Crowe 
concurred stating “It is clear that Germany is practically determined to go to war, and that the 
one restraining influence so far has been the fear of England…”262  On July 28 Austria declared 
war on Serbia but a full scale war did not yet break out.  
  The French Ambassador in Berlin suggested a British mediation proposal, which the 
German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs consented to if London could keep the Russian 
Army from mobilizing. Additionally, Germany would only agree to mediation between Austria 
and Russia and refused to “interfere in Austro-Serbian quarrel.”263Crowe regarded the Secretary 
of State’s remarks as proof that “the German Government has up to now said not a single word at 
Vienna in the direction of restraint and moderation.”264 
With Austria declaring war, hostility towards Germany was at an all time high in Great 
Britain. In the British Foreign Office, everything Germany now did was perceived to be another 
way for Germany to justify war to the Great Britain. British leaders believed Germany would do 
anything to keep Britain from aiding of France or Russia.  Hostility towards German leaders did 
not allow foreign officials to see events clearly. When Bethmann-Hollweg told the British 
ambassador that the Russians were burning houses along the German frontier and were now 
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taking military measures there, Crowe responded that Germany was looking to throw blame for 
the mobilization onto the Russians.265 Arthur Nicolson agreed stating it was a “very reasonable 
and sensible precaution” for Russia to be taking.266  
With Austria’s declaration of war, Russia had begun mobilization without declaring war. 
When Germany learned of this two days later on July 30 they sent ultimatums to Russia and 
France demanding that Russia cease mobilization within twenty-four hours and for France to 
stay neutral in the case of war between Germany and Russia. On August 1 the deadlines for those 
ultimatums passed and Germany openly declared war on Russia and began mobilization. The 
next day Germany issued an ultimatum to Belgium. Germany stated that if German troops were 
allowed to go through Belgium on the way to France, Germany would guarantee Belgium’s 
“territorial integrity.” The Belgian’s declined the offer.267 
On July 31 1914, Crowe sent a hastily written memorandum to Sir Edward Grey where 
he detailed Great Britain’s foreign policy. He concluded by stating that it was in Britain’s best 
interests to stand by France “in her hour of need. France has not sought the quarrel. It has been 
forced upon her.”268 Richard Cosgrove asserted in his dissertation that Crowe had little to do 
with policy decisions including during the July Crisis. Cosgrove argues that it “is difficult to see 
any direct influence exerted by Crowe during the July Crisis.”269 Cosgrove dismisses this letter 
claiming Grey was too busy to read it, but Cosgrove gives no evidence to prove this statement. 
Furthermore, he disregards all the minute notes that Crowe wrote on foreign office documents, 
including the ones that Sir Edward Grey made notes under citing Crowe. While Britain 
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ultimately joined the war after Germany violated Belgian neutrality, Crowe’s influence can 
hardly be discredited. It was Crowe’s arguments surrounding Germany hegemony of Europe that 
forced Sir Edward Grey and the British government to finally declare war. 
With the violation of Belgian neutrality and war being hoisted upon France, the British 
government could no longer sit idly by. The British government’s hostility towards Germany and 
their suspicion of a German motivation could not allow England to sit out of the war. In fact the 
growing fear of Germany over the last nine years all but determined that when a war with 
Germany arose, England would have to join. The war could have come sooner or later, but war 
between Germany and Great Britain had become almost inevitable. The only thing left had been 
to sit back and wait for the actual fighting to start. Crowe had realized war with Germany was 
coming as early as 1906. The British government could not allow German hegemony of Europe, 
even if that was not what Germany claimed to be after. Sir Edward Grey noted that if “victory 
came to Germany…our situation at the end of the war would be very uncomfortable.”270 German 
hegemony of Europe would challenge Great Britain’s prestige and interest’s world wide and the 
British foreign office could not allow that. Grey felt that British interests and public opinion 
meant that he must “deal with it in Parliament.”271 The British Government declared war on 
Germany on August 6t 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Eyre Crowe was an illustrious, inscrutable and intelligent man. Cosgrove was correct when he 
stated that Crowe “was never a typical member of the Foreign Office.”272 Crowe was arrogant 
and opinionated with a tendency to insubordinate. He pushed his opinions even when he was not 
asked for them, and he certainly could rub people the wrong way. Crowe could never be 
considered a typical “English gentleman.”273 He had neither the upbringing nor the personality 
for it. Crowe preferred to reading or playing the piano rather than hunting or fishing. He was an 
intellectual and that alienated him from some members of the foreign office.  
 But above all of this, Crowe was an influential member of the British Foreign Office. He 
produced a memorandum that was not only correct in predicting a war between Great Britain and 
Germany but predicted the motivations behind British entry into the war. This does not suggest 
that Crowe expected World War I to break out in the fashion it did. The Crowe memorandum did 
not suggest that it would be a world war, rather than a localized conflict between Britain and 
Germany. The fact that historians are still debating the 1907 “Memorandum on the Present State 
of British Relations with France and Germany” suggests that Crowe was at least partially correct 
in what he argued.  
 Furthermore, Crowe’s legacy has stood the test of time. Anyone reading British Foreign 
Office documents from this period would clearly see Crowe’s influence. Grey, Nicolson, 
Hardinge, Bertie and others all agreed with Crowe’s assessments on the German government at 
one point in time or another. Grey and Nicolson both noted that Crowe’s arguments were useful 
and valid in determining British Foreign Policy. While Crowe may have never been close friends 
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with some of his colleagues in the foreign office, one can not over look Crowe’s influence 
because of that. 
 Crowe was consistent in his suspicion of the German government. His analysis of 
German motivations in regards to the naval negotiations, the Baghdad railway, the Second 
Moroccan crisis and the July Crisis were all correct. In addition, his correct views of the 
situations created a deep suspicion and hostility towards the German government in the British 
Foreign Office. While the British Foreign Office might not have jumped to war with Germany 
over the naval negotiations or the Baghdad railway does not discount Crowe’s influence or 
British suspicion of Germany as Cosgrove asserted. Grey and the British government had to 
handle public opinion, which was largely pacifistic at the time. The British government could not 
afford to declare war on Germany without justification. An unruly Kaiser and German 
government, which under minded negotiations at every turn, were not justifiable reasons to go to 
war for the British public. They were, however, reasons for the British government to be hostile 
towards Germany and choose to join the entente when war eventually broke out.  
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